

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1361968-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 157

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To: Jack Anderson

2-9-89

Re. John Fower

SMA Time - early seventies
Incident - Fower taking female
JOAN congressional staffer

home. He attacks her.

She fights him off.

For more info

b6
b7C
b7D

contact

or

161-20403507

cc's

[FBI]

Sen Nunn and committee

7 APR 25 1989

Emilio

SPEC. INQ.

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
KEEP ENVELOPE ATTACHED

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
KEEP ENVELOPE ATTACHED



Re. John Tower
investigation

F. B. I

Washington, DC

20000

Memorandum

b6
b7c



To: DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: [REDACTED] ROOM 4371)

Date February 9, 1989

From: SAC, WMFO (161-A-19411) (P)

Subject: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

SPIN

BUDED: past RE: Butelcall to WMFO of 2/7/89;
WMFO routing slip to FBIHQ
of 1/24/89.

[REDACTED] Special Inquiry, Department
of Defense, 400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia, provided
the appended document in response to the referenced requests.

Also appended is the Department of Defense Security
Office records check on [REDACTED]

SYNOPSIS

SPECIAL INQUIRY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3-ENCLOSURE

APR 25 1989

1-FBIHQ
1-WMFO

6/1/89

Memorandum

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b7c



SSR

CLASS

To : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: [REDACTED] ROOM 4371)

Date February 9, 1989

From : SAC, WMFO (161A - 19411) (P)

Subject : JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

SPIN

BUDED: past

RE: butelcal to WMFO of 2/8/89

Enclosed find AFOSI's response to AD CLARKE's written request of 2/8/89, regarding additional files having [REDACTED] as their subject.

1- ENCLOSURE

1-FBIHQ
1-WMFO

161-20403-509

7 APR 25 1989

6/pb

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription February 9, 1989

CECIL FRY, Chief, Information Release Branch, United States Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Building P-3, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., after being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent, provided the enclosed two pages of documents in response to the written request by FLOYD I. CLARKE, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated February 8, 1989.

He was able to supply

Investigation on February 9, 1989 at Washington, D.C. File # WMFO 161A-19411

by SA thj Date dictated February 9, 1989

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

161-20403-509
ENCLOSURE

Memorandum



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b7C

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ESP
CLASS
SEC'D
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REC

To : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATTN: [redacted] ROOM 4371)

Date 2/9/89

From : SAC, WMFO (161 A- 19411)

(P)

[Signature]

Subject : JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

SPIN (A)

BUDED: PAST

RE: WMFO routing slip dated 2/8/89.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the Following interviews:

1) WMF T-1

2) [redacted]

3) [redacted]

4) [redacted]


Also enclosed are the results of checks conducted at the Department of State concerning [redacted] and the appointee.

Additionally [redacted] furnished supplemental travel information regarding the appointee.

4 ENCLOSURE

1-FBIHQ
1-WMFO

161-20403-510



6/4pm



161-20403-510

ENCLOSURE

WMFO 161A-19411
RSB:alp

MISCELLANEOUS

The following investigation was conducted on February 8, 1989, by SA [REDACTED] regarding the appointee, JOHN GOODWIN TOWER. b6 Per FBI b7C Per FBI Referral/Direct

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The file included no specific information which would implicate the appointee, JOHN TOWER, with any wrongdoing with regard to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

2/8/89

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] advised the interviewing agent that she had additional information concerning the travel of former Senator TOWER during 1987. She stated that this information will supplement information which she furnished to the interviewing agent on 2/6/89 concerning this same travel.

[redacted] advised that a further review of available records revealed that the following individuals accompanied TOWER on the specific flights listed below:

7/4/87 - London to Dallas, Texas by American Airlines flight number 79. TOWER was accompanied by [redacted]

8/28/87 - Islamabad to Karachi by PK flight number 301. TOWER was accompanied by [redacted]

8/29/87 - Karachi to London by British Air flight number 416. TOWER was accompanied by [redacted]

Investigation on 2/7/89 at Washington, D.C. File # WMFO 161A-19411
by SA [redacted] *PR* RPC:anc Date dictated 2/8/89

FORMS: TEXT HAS A DOCUMENT

INBOX.19 (#7346)

TEXT:

VZCZCPD0012

OO HQ SE

DE PD #0012 0401950

ZNR UUUUU

O 091930Z FEB 89

FM FBI PORTLAND (161R-709).(RUC)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI SEATTLE/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS

CITE: //3670//

PASS: SPIN UNIT..

SUBJECT: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN (A).

FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU AND SEATTLE, ON FEBRUARY 9, 1989,
JIM HAMILTON; GREENLEAF HELICOPTERS, PEARSON AIRPARK, 101 EAST
RESERVE, VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON (TELEPHONE (206) 694-2483),
TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE PORTLAND DIVISION REGARDING JOHN
TOWER. HAMILTON ADVISED THAT WHILE HE WAS EMPLOYED AT SOUTHERN
AIRWAYS OF MINERAL WELLS, TEXAS, IT WAS BELIEVED THAT THEN SENATOR
TOWER PRESSURED OFFICIALS OF SOUTHERN AIRWAYS TO DEDUCT \$150,000

7 APR 25 1989

CC DESTROYED

Exec AD Adm.	_____
Exec AD Inv.	_____
Exec AD LES	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Servs.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Insp.	_____
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Rec. Mgmt.	_____
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Training	_____
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

GRIN IN
TL RM 4383

161-20403-512

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6/10/89

PAGE TWO DE PD 0012 UNCLAS

EACH MONTH FROM THE SOUTHERN AIRWAYS EMPLOYEES' PAYCHECKS AS A CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION. IN RETURN, SENATOR TOWER WOULD ATTEMPT TO KEEP SOUTHERN AIRWAYS IN BUSINESS. HAMILTON BELIEVES THAT SOUTHERN AIRWAYS WAS DUE TO CLOSE UPON THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR SINCE SOUTHERN AIRWAYS' PRIMARY FUNCTION WAS TO TRAIN HELICOPTER PILOTS FOR THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

SEATTLE WILL IMMEDIATELY CONTACT JIM HAMILTON FOR COMPLETE DETAILS OF THE ABOVE ALLEGATION. SUTEL BUREAU AND SET FORTH ANY APPROPRIATE LEADS.

BT

#0012

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

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b7C

00101

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02/09/89	UNCLAS
IMMEDIATE	
FM DIRECTOR FBI	
TO FBI DALLAS (161A-2025) IMMEDIATE	
BT	
UNCLAS	
JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN (A); BUDED: PAST	
RE TEL CAL FROM SSA [REDACTED] SPIN; TO SSA [REDACTED]	
DELAWARE, ON 2-9-89.	
DALLAS IS REQUESTED TO REINTERVIEW [REDACTED]	
[REDACTED] DALLAS, TEXAS.	
DETERMINE IF [REDACTED] ADVISED APPOINTEE TO GIVE UP THE	
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL AS PART OF HIS ADVICE TO ASSIST IN	
APPOINTEE'S RECOVERY FROM RECENT COLON SURGERY. ALSO,	
DETERMINE EFFECT ON APPOINTEE'S HEALTH. IF HE WERE TO RESUME	
CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL AND WHAT LEVEL OF CONSUMPTION WOULD POSE	
A THREAT TO APPOINTEE'S LIFE/HEALTH.	
ALSO DETERMINE COMPARATIVE MEANING OF [REDACTED]	
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT APPOINTEE'S SMAC 20 OR 28 TEST	
161-20403-513	
REC/R	RJD/KLD KAD 02/09/89 4371

RETURN TO [REDACTED] ROOM 4371

7 APR 25 1989

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MR 05482
FEB 10 1989

b/pw

2

CONTINUATION - PFC

SHOWED HIS LIVER PROFILE TO BE "COMPLETELY NORMAL". WHAT TYPE PERSON WOULD APPOINTEE'S CONDITION BE COMPARED TO? MALE OF SIMILAR AGE AND/OR CONDITION WITH NO HISTORY OF ALCOHOL? MODERATE HISTORY OF ALCOHOL OR EXCESSIVE HISTORY OF CONSUMPTION?

DALLAS IS REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY COVER LEAD, MEMORIALIZE INTERVIEW IN FD-302 AND FACSIMILE SAME DIRECTLY TO SPIN UNIT FACSIMILE MACHINE (324-2568).

BT

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORMb6
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00102

DATE	1 3	
02/09/89	UNCLAS	IMMEDIATE
FM DIRECTOR FBI (161-20403)		
TO FBI DALLAS (161A-2025) IMMEDIATE		
FBI SAN FRANCISCO (161A-4802) IMMEDIATE		
FBI HOUSTON (161A-1816) IMMEDIATE		
BT		
UNCLAS		
JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN (A); BUDED: PAST		
REFERENCE BUREAU FACSIMILE TO DL AND SF ON 2/9/89 WHICH		
CONTAINED A ONE PAGE MEMORANDUM FROM THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES		
COMMITTEE REGARDING INFORMATION PROVIDED BY [REDACTED]		
RETEL CAL FROM SSA [REDACTED] SPIN, TO SSA [REDACTED] HO, AND TO		
SA [REDACTED] CORPUS CHRISTI, ON 2/9/89.		
SF: INTERVIEW [REDACTED] TELEPHONE NUMBER		
[REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] REGARDING THE INFORMATION HE		
PROVIDED TO THE SASC IN RE FACS, TO INCLUDE THE IDENTITIES OF		
ANY ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUALS WHO COULD CORROBORATE OR		
SUBSTANTIATE HIS ALLEGATIONS.		
FIC/RD		
PBM/RNA	02/09/89	4371

RETURN TO [REDACTED] ROOM 4371.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MR 0250
FEB 9 8 1989

6/1 pm

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PA 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

DL: INTERVIEW [] LAST NAME UNKNOWN (LNU) AND []

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LNU AT THE MANSION BAR IN DALLAS, TEXAS REGARDING THE INFORMATION [] PROVIDED CONCERNING SENATOR TOWER. IF THEY ADVISE THAT SENATOR TOWER IS KNOWN TO FREQUENT THE MANSION BAR, ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED. AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED SHOULD INCLUDE THE FREQUENCY OF TOWER'S VISITS, THEIR OBSERVATION OF TOWER'S USE OF ALCOHOL (TIME FRAME, AMOUNT OF USE, HIS ACTIONS, ANY INSTANCES OF OUTRAGEOUS BEHAVIOR ON HIS PART), AND IF THEY CAN IDENTIFY ANY REGULAR COMPANION OF TOWER'S THAT SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED. DL IS ALSO REQUESTED TO ASK WHETHER INTERVIEWS FOR TOWER IS SUBJECT TO COMPROMISE, WOULD DIVULGE SENSITIVE INFORMATION OR IS INCOMPETENT TO SERVE DUE TO ALCOHOL ABUSE.

HOUSTON: IS TO DETERMINE IF THE HOUSTON SCHOOL OF DANCE EXISTED FROM 1/1/87 TO DATE. CONTACT LOGICAL SOURCES AND REFERENCE MATERIALS.

HO IS ALSO REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW [] AS PER PERSONAL REQUEST OF U.S. SENATOR SAM NUNN ON 2/8/89. SENATOR NUNN IS INTERESTED IN CONFIRMING LONG TIME RELATIONSHIP OF TOWER TO [] AS [] WHO MAY HAVE HELPED

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

Page 3

CONTINUATION SHEET

APPOINTEE [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIALITY HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AS PER HER PRIOR INTERVIEWS BY HOUSTON. [REDACTED] SHOULD ALSO BE INTERVIEWED AS TO HER KNOWLEDGE OF DRINKING, WOMANIZING, AND EFFECT OF BOTH ON APPOINTEE'S PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO COMPROMISE OR POTENTIAL TO DIVULGE SENSITIVE INFORMATION. ALSO, ESTABLISH TIME FRAME FOR ANY DEROGATORY COMMENTS AND WHETHER ANY SUCH COMMENTS ARE BASED ON FIRSTHAND OR HEARSAY INFORMATION. DETERMINE IS SHE FEELS ALCOHOL WOULD IMPAIR APPOINTEE'S ABILITY TO FUNCTION IN ANY REGARD AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: COULD HE MAKE THE WRONG DECISIONS DUE TO ALCOHOL? REASK QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY POSED TO [REDACTED] ENSURE ALL ISSUES COVERED AND ASK ANY QUESTION INTERVIEWING AGENT DEEMS APPROPRIATE.

AS RECEIVING OFFICES ARE PREVIOUSLY AWARE, LEADS SHOULD BE COVERED EXPEDITIOUSLY. RESULT SHOULD BE RECEIVED IN THE SPIN UNIT BY 2/13/89. DIRECT RESULTS TO THE ATTENTION OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SPIN UNIT, FACSIMILE NUMBER 324-2574.

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INBOX 205 (161A-205)
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OF INVESTIGATION

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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

VZCZCOC0005

RR HQ DL

DE OC #0005 0392020

ZNR UUUUU

R 082035Z FEB 89

FM FBI OKLAHOMA CITY (161A-R-492B)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/ROUTINE/

DALLAS (161A-2025)/ROUTINE/

BT

UNCLAS

CITE: //3580:4096//

PASS: [REDACTED] SPIN UNIT, ROOM 4371.

GENWIN
TL RM 4383

SUBJECT: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN(A); BUDED: PAST; OO: FBIHQ.

REFERENCE DALLAS TELETYPE TO OKLAHOMA CITY, DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989.

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1989, RECORDS REQUESTED BY DALLAS WERE OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED] AMERICAN AIRLINES, TULSA, OKLAHOMA.

PASSENGER MANIFEST WAS FACSIMILED TO THE FORT WORTH RA ON FEBRUARY 8, 1989, AND ORIGINAL COPIES WILL BE SENT BY AIRBORNE EXPRESS TO FORT WORTH ON THIS DATE. AIRBORNE EXPRESS AIRLINE

CC DESTROYED

6/10/89

PAGE TWO DE OC 0005 UNCLAS

NUMBER IS 168371151.

SINCE NO LEADS ARE OUTSTANDING IN THE OKLAHOMA CITY
DIVISION, THIS CASE WILL BE CONSIDERED RUC'D.

BT

#0005

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ASS

SEE

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TELETYPE UNIT

9 FEB 89 107-182

FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

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Director's Sec'y	_____

INBOX.32 (#10518)

TEXT:

VECCZCDE0013

RR HQ

DE DL #0013 0430440

ZNR UUUUU

R 000433Z FEB 89

FM FBI DALLAS (161A-2025) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/ROUTINE/

BT

UNCLAS

CITE: //4340//

PASS: HQ: SSA [REDACTED] SPIN UNIT.

SUBJECT: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN(A); BUDED: PAST; OO: BUREAU.

RE DALLAS TELETYPE TO BUREAU, DATED 2/7/89.

FOR INFORMATION BUREAU, ON FEBRUARY 7, 1989, FLIGHT

ATTENDANTS [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] ALL OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, WERE INTERVIEWED. ALL WERE AWARE OF APPOINTEE BUT NONE COULD RECALL APPOINTEE BEING ON AMERICAN AIRLINES (AAL) FLIGHT 50 FROM DALLAS/FT. WORTH INTERNATIONAL (DFW) TO LONDON, ENGLAND ON JUNE 26, 1987. ALL STATED THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RECALL ANY INCIDENT OF A NATURE ALLEGED IN PREVIOUS INTERVIEW

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161-20403-515

7 APR 25 1989

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PAGE TWO DE DL 0013 UNCLAS

THAT APPOINTEE WAS DRINKING EXCESSIVELY AND BEING PROBLEMATIC ON THE FLIGHT.

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1989, (4)
ARLINGTON, TEXAS, ADVISED HE COULD NOT RECALL APPOINTEE BEING ON BOARD AAL FLIGHT 50 ON JUNE 26, 1987. HOWEVER, ADVISED HE GENERALLY HAS LITTLE CONTACT WITH PASSENGERS. HE FELT CERTAIN THAT ANY INCIDENT OF DRUNK AND UNRULY BEHAVIOR ON THE PART OF A PASSENGER WOULD BE REPORTED TO THE COCKPIT CREW. THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF A PASSENGER OF THE NOTORIETY AND PUBLIC INTEREST OF APPOINTEE.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING CONDUCTED UPON AVAILABILITY OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS FOR FLIGHT 50, AAL, ON JUNE 26, 1987.

BT

#0013

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FEB 14 '89

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FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION

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Adm. Serv.	_____
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Off. Liaison & Int. Affs.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

INBOX. 37MM (#7027) INFORMATION OFFICE

TEXT:

VZCZCEPO009

OO HQ HO SA WF

DE EP #0009 0392243

ZNR UUUUU

O 082225Z FEB 89

FM FBI EL PASO (161A-NEW) (RUC)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI HOUSTON (161A-1816)/IMMEDIATE/

FBI SAN ANTONIO (161A-1466)/IMMEDIATE/

FBI WMFO (161A-19411)/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN (A); BUDED: PAST.

RE HOUSTON TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, EL PASO, SAN ANTONIO, AND WMFO, FEBRUARY 7, 1989.

EFFORT TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW [REDACTED] AS SET OUT BY REFERENCED HOUSTON TELETYPE BY EL PASO DETERMINED THE FOLLOWING:

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1989, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED] ADVISED [REDACTED] HAS

CC DESTROYED

7 APR 25 1989

GRANDIN
TL 161-20403-516 RM 4383

b/jpr

PAGE TWO DE EP 0009 UNCLAS

BEEN RETIRED FOR MANY YEARS FROM [REDACTED] AND HAS
SERVED AS A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS ALSO RETIRED
FROM THIS POSITION AND IS NOW RESIDING WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA. ADDRESS OBTAINED IS AS
FOLLOWS: [REDACTED] REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA, 6312, TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

ON FEBRUARY 8, 1989, CONTACT WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EL PASO, TEXAS, REFLECTED AN ADDITIONAL ADDRESS OF

[REDACTED] REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 6350,
TELEPHONE NUMBER [REDACTED]

IT IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU AS TO HOW
CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE WITH [REDACTED] IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA.

BT

#0009

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Exec AD Inv	_____
Exec AD LES	_____
Asst Dir	_____
Adm Servs	_____
Ident	_____
Intell	_____
Lab	_____
Legal Coun	_____
Off Cong & Public Affs	_____
Rec Mgmt	_____
Tech Servs	_____
Training	_____
Off Liaison & Int. Affs	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

INBOX.7 (#1533)

TEXT:

VEZCZCSA0002

OO HQ WMFO

DE SA 40052 3401505

ZNR UUUUU

O 091535Z FEB 89

FM ELI SAN ANTONIO (161A-1466) (P)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/IMMEDIATE/

FBI WMFO (161A-19411)/IMMEDIATE/

BT

UNCLAS

CITE: //3770//

SPIN
TEL 114 RM 4383

SPIN

SUBJECT: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN (A), BUDED: PAST.

REFERENCE TELCAL OF SA [] TO ANALYST []

[] SPIN UNIT, ON FEBRUARY 3, 1939 AND HOUSTON TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, EL PASO, SAN ANTONIO AND WMFO.

INVESTIGATION AT TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE IN AUSTIN, TEXAS REVEALED THAT THERE ARE NO CURRENT FILES REGARDING CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SENATOR TOWER. 161-20403-517

TELEPHONE CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC), 999 E STREET, WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONE NUMBER []

CC DESTROYED

Send
three
tubes

CALLER:
By [] Time 3:19 pm

6/1/89

PAGE TWO DE SA 0002 UNCLAS

(800) 424-9530. THEY STATED THAT THE REC DID NOT EXIST PRIOR TO 1976 BUT THAT THE RECORDS IN QUESTION SHOULD BE ON MICROFILM AND ARE AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW AT THEIR OFFICE.

WMFO AT WASHINGTON, D.C. REVIEW RECORDS AT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION REGARDING [REDACTED] CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION TO TOWER'S RE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

BT

#0002

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REC

REPORTING OFFICE MEMPHIS	OFFICE OF ORIGIN BUREAU	DATE 2/9/89	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 2/7/89
TITLE OF CASE JOHN GOODWIN TOWER		REPORT MADE BY SA [REDACTED]	TYPED BY mcg
		CHARACTER OF CASE SPECIAL INQUIRY - PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE	

REFERENCE

Memphis telephone call to [REDACTED] 2/7/89.

RUC

ADMINISTRATIVE

This case was predicated upon information received from [REDACTED] on 2/5/89, stating that he had information re appointee being under the influence of alcohol, and touching women in ways he considered inappropriate.

[REDACTED] was advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974, confidentiality was not requested. (P)

The following indices were searched on 2/9/89, by the following individuals with negative results: Automated and manual indices by [REDACTED] ELSUR indices by [REDACTED] and Confidential indices by [REDACTED]

Indices check re appointee previously submitted by Memphis teletype dated 12/7/88, BU file 161-20403.

APPROVED [Signature]	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW	
COPIES MADE: 2 - Bureau 1 - Memphis (161A-1424) CC DESTROYED		161-20403-518	
		7 APR 25 1989	
Dissemination Record of Attached Report		Notations	
Agency		6/4pm	
Request Recd.			
Date Fwd.			
How Fwd.			
By			

COVER PAGE

A*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

SA [REDACTED]

2/9/89

Office: Memphis

Field Office File #: 161A-1424

Bureau File #:

Title: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

Character: SPECIAL INQUIRY - PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE

Synopsis:

On 2/7/89, [REDACTED] was interviewed at Memphis, Tennessee and stated that while assigned to the BERGSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, Austin, Texas, he observed appointee JOHN GOODWIN TOWER under the influence of alcohol on two occasions. He also stated that he observed JOHN GOODWIN TOWER touching two women in a manner that was inappropriate.

RUC

DETAILS:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

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PAGE 1 OF 5	FEBRUARY 12, 1989		CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS	PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE
SSP LASS RC'D ER EC				
FM DIRECTOR, FBI (161-20403) TO FBI DALLAS (161A-2025) IMMEDIATE FBI HOUSTON (161A-1816) IMMEDIATE FBI NEW ORLEANS (161A-1124) IMMEDIATE FBI OKLAHOMA CITY (161A-1338) IMMEDIATE FBI WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE (161A-19411) IMMEDIATE BT UNCLAS JOHN GOODWIN TOWER; SPIN (A); BUDED: PAST. RE OKLAHOMA CITY (WITH COPY TO DALLAS) AND NEW ORLEANS TELETYPES TO FBIHQ DATED 2/10/89 AND CAPTIONED ABOVE. RE TEL CAL ON 2/11/89 BY SA [] SPIN, TO SSA [] HOUSTON. RE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD'S TELETYPE TO DALLAS DATED 2/11/89. NEW ORLEANS IS REQUESTED TO INTERVIEW [] [] TO DETERMINE IF HE KNEW OF ANY MANDATORY DEDUCTION OF \$150 TAKEN FROM EITHER HIS OR OTHER SOUTHERN AIRWAYS (SA)				
DO NOT TYPE MESSAGE BELOW THIS LINE				
APPROVED BY: <i>FUC/R. J. L.</i>	DRAFTED BY: RJD:vm	DATE: 2/12/89	ROOM: 4371	TELE EX: []

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161-20403-520

3 MAR 21 1989

 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
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 FEB 12 1989

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FBI/DOJ

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORMb6
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PAGE

2

CONTINUATION SHEET

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EMPLOYEES WITH REGARD TO CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO
20 SENATOR TOWER. DETERMINE IF EFFORT BY SA OFFICIALS WAS SELF
18 INITIATED OR IN RESPONSE TO PRESSURE OR SUGGESTION FROM
APPOINTEE OR ONE OF HIS STAFF MEMBERS. OBTAIN COPY OF MEMO
16 PUBLISHING THIS SOLICITATION OF \$150 CONTRIBUTION, IF
AVAILABLE. DETERMINE HOW MUCH WAS COLLECTED, TO WHOM WAS MONEY
14 PAID AS WELL AS WHAT WAS DISCUSSED AS QUID PRO QUO FOR MONIES
COLLECTED. DETERMINE WHAT KNOWLEDGE, IF ANY, TOWER HAD OF THIS
12 COLLECTION. EFFORTS TO INTERVIEW KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONS SHOULD
CONCENTRATE ON SA MANAGERIAL PERSONNEL (E.G., [REDACTED])
10 [REDACTED] TO ESTABLISH ORIGINATOR/ORGANIZER OF
CONTRIBUTION EFFORT AND WHETHER ANY PRESSURE WAS BROUGHT TO
8 BEAR TO FORCE SA EMPLOYEES TO CONTRIBUTE.

DALLAS IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW PAYROLL RECORDS/SA INTERNAL
6 CORRESPONDENCE TO SEE IF DEDUCTION EVER TAKEN AND WHAT WERE
TERMS OF DEDUCTION/SOLICITATION BY SA OFFICIALS. DETERMINE
4 WHICH SA OFFICIAL MAY HAVE CONCEIVED OF IDEA TO DEDUCT/SOLICIT
\$150 FROM SA EMPLOYEES. DETERMINE IF SA EVER WENT OUT OF
2 BUSINESS AND CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND THE CLOSING/LOSS OF SA'S
CONTRACT AT THE FORT WOLTON, TEXAS, HELICOPTER TRAINING

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

PAGE 3

CONTINUATION SHEET

▶ START HERE

FACILITY.

20 IN REINTERVIEWS OF [REDACTED] AS WELL
18 AS INTERVIEWS OF ELWIN SKILES, SR. AND ELWIN SKILES, JR.,
DALLAS IS REQUESTED TO ASK TIME FRAME OF ALCOHOL ABUSE, TYPE
16 AND NUMBER OF DRINKS; APPOINTEE IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO
COMPROMISE/DIVULGE SENSITIVE INFORMATION OR WOULD BE HINDERED
14 IN ABILITY TO PERFORM AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. EMPHASIZE
NUCLEAR AND WAR TIME RESPONSIBILITIES OF POSITION AS SECRETARY
12 OF DEFENSE. DALLAS SHOULD NOT ONLY VERIFY PRIOR ABUSE (1971 -
1988) BUT ANY USE TO DATE. IF POSSIBLE, DALLAS IS TO INTERVIEW
10 ELWIN SKILES, SR., FORMER PRESIDENT, HARDEN-SIMMONS UNIVERSITY,
DALLAS, TEXAS, TO DETERMINE EXTENT AND SEVERITY OF HIS SON'S
8 ALLEGED MORAL CORRUPTION BY APPOINTEE PRIOR TO INTERVIEW OF
ELWIN SKILES, JR.

6 WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN FIELD OFFICE IS REQUESTED TO
REINTERVIEW T-14 AND ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING ISSUES: KNOWLEDGE
4 AS TO ALLEGED IMPROPER ACTS LISTED BELOW BETWEEN 1968-1970
WHICH WAS PERIOD IN WHICH [REDACTED] UNITED
2 SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE (USLL); DID T-14 KNOW OF TELEPHONE SET-
UP TO HAVE PROSTITUTES SENT BY PREARRANGED CODE TO GO TO

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORMb6
b7c

PAGE

4

CONTINUATION SHEET

▶ START HERE

CARROLL ARMS OR TO THE WATERGATE TO MEET WITH TOWER; T-14'S
KNOWLEDGE OF USLL MONTHLY BILL FROM CARROLL ARMS HOTEL FOR ROOM
FOR TOWER? FOR MONTHLY TAB AT QUORUM CLUB? KNOWLEDGE OF T-14
RE "AUDITION" OF SECRETARIAL APPLICANTS OF POTENTIAL SEX
PARTNERS OF TOWER?

BECAUSE THIS ALLEGATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY SENATE ARMED
SERVICES COMMITTEE, EACH ASPECT OF THIS ALLEGATION MUST BE
SPECIFICALLY EXPLORED WITH USLL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

U. S. SAVINGS AND LOAN LEAGUE, 1709 NEW YORK AVENUE, NORTHWEST,
WASHINGTON, D. C. IF [REDACTED] AND/OR [REDACTED] HAVE
ALREADY BEEN INTERVIEWED, ENSURE THAT ABOVE ISSUES HAVE BEEN
ADDRESSED OR HAVE THEM REINTERVIEWED.

WASHINGTON FIELD IS ALSO REQUESTED TO RECONTACT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] REGISTRATION UNIT, INTERNAL SECURITY UNIT,
DOJ, RE APPOINTEE'S OBLIGATION TO REGISTER UNDER FOREIGN AGENTS
REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938 (ACT). SPECIFICALLY, REVIEW FILE,
OBTAIN COPIES OF APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS AND INTERVIEW [REDACTED]
TO DETERMINE HOW DETAILED WERE REPRESENTATIONS BY TOWER'S
ATTORNEY CONCERNING TYPE OF ACTIVITIES (I.E., CONSULTANT OR

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORMb6
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CONTINUATION SHEET

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LOBBYIST) CONTEMPLATED, WHICH COMPANIES INVOLVED; PROJECTED
20 REMUNERATION TO TOWER; BASES FOR GRANTING EXEMPTION TO
18 REGISTER; DEFINITION OF "FOREIGN AGENT," CIVIL AND/OR CRIMINAL
PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO REGISTER IF REQUIRED TO DO SO; HOW
16 COULD PAYMENT OF OVER \$250,000 BY A SINGLE EMPLOYER (WHICH IS A
SUBSIDIARY OF A FOREIGN, MULTI-NATIONAL COMPANY) AND NOT
14 TRIGGER NEED TO REGISTER; ANY DISTINCTION UNDER THE ACT MADE
BETWEEN DEFENSE OR NON-DEFENSE CONSULTATION/LOBBYIST?

12 HOUSTON AT CORPUS CHRISTI IS REQUESTED TO RECONTACT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO DETERMINE HOW MANY AND WHAT TYPE OF DRINK DID
10 APPOINTEE CONSUME?

BT

!

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S.T.
OH

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT March 17, 1989

Response is being coordinated by OCPA.

Mr. William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Bill:

Enclosed is an article from today's Washington Post which, once again, attacks the reputation of John Tower.

What is particularly disturbing about this story is that it is based on: "an internal Federal Bureau of Investigation document made public by Senator Ernest F. Hollings. The document, which a bureau official said was prepared for use by FBI director William Sessions, provides the first official although partial, verification of what the FBI discovered in its background investigation of Tower."

We are outraged to see Senator Tower once again dragged through the mud after the confirmation vote. But we are even more upset that it was apparently based on an unauthorized disclosure of official documents by an FBI employee.

We'd like to know:

- 1) What is FBI policy against turning over such documents to Senators, and what is the penalty for violating the policy?
- 2) Are you investigating who is responsible for this leak, and what is the status of your investigation?
- 3) What actions will you take against the perpetrators of this leak? Will you do everything you can to determine who is responsible?
- 4) Will you inform all FBI employees that you will not tolerate any more such leaks?

Sincerely,

Don Dale

John McCain

ENCLOSURE

161-20403

161-20403-521

John McCain

U.S. SENATOR

727

'Prior Pattern' of Alcohol Abuse By Tower Cited in FBI Document

The long FBI investigation into former senator John G. Tower found "a prior pattern of alcohol abuse" as well as "indications" that Tower had sharply cut back on his drinking in recent years, according to an internal Federal Bureau of Investigation document made public yesterday by Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.).

The document, which a bureau official said was prepared for use by FBI director William Sessions, provides the first official, although partial, verification of what the FBI discovered in its background investigation of Tower, whose nomination to be secretary of defense was defeated by the Senate last week.

The FBI review of Tower's past included 500 interviews in 38 cities and seven foreign countries.

Investigators looked into 69 separate allegations and produced nine memoranda on Tower which ran 371 pages, plus another 137 pages of enclosures.

"The FBI investigation did not disclose any illegal activity on the part of Sen. Tower," the document said.

"However, the investigation did confirm a prior pattern of alcohol abuse, as well as the senator's continuing sporadic use of alcohol, with indications that he had greatly reduced his consumption levels during 1983-1989."

161-20403-521
ENCLOSURE

March 7, 1989

Ed:

RE: SENATE APPROPRIATIONS STAFF
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Attached is the briefing material requested by Budget Section Chief Linda Pagelsen requested in your March 3, 1989 note.

The attached briefing material concerns two issues; FBI Special Inquiry (SPIN) investigations and the background investigation (BI) of John Goodwin Tower.

While [redacted] request to Ms. Pagelsen concerns only the first issue of the general topic of BIs, specific information on the Tower investigation is included for response to issues raised in that particular SPIN investigation.


Floyd I. Clarke

Enclosures (2)

- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Clarke
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - Special Assistants, CID


JVD:jmb (8)

Exec AD Adm. _____
 Exec AD Inv. _____
 Exec AD LES _____
 Asst. Dir.: _____
 Adm. Servs. _____
 Crim. Inv. _____
 Ident. _____
 Insp. _____
 Intell. _____
 Lab. _____
 Legal Coun. _____
 Off. Cong. & _____
 Public Affs. _____
 Rec. Mgmt. _____
 Tech. Serv. _____
 Training _____
 Off. Liaison _____
 Int. Affs. _____
 Telephone Rm. _____
 Director's Sec'y _____

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March 3, 1989

Floyd:

RE: SENATE APPROPRIATIONS STAFF
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

On March 3, 1989, [redacted] who is on the [redacted]

[redacted] called with a request for information in preparation for the Senate hearing on the FBI's 1990 budget. The hearing is presently scheduled for March 16, 1989, at 9:30 a.m. with Director Sessions as the principal witness.

Specifically, [redacted] has requested a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI, the Attorney General, and the White House regarding background investigations conducted on Presidential appointees. Secondly, [redacted] requested that the FBI provide her with a briefing paper on the general topic of background investigations, to include the actual process of conducting this type of investigation and the nature of the information. [redacted] indicated that she would like as much information as possible in order to fully understand the FBI's investigative effort in this area and, in turn, to adequately prepare [redacted] for the hearing. Budget Section Chief Linda Pagelsen suggested that the FBI would be pleased to provide a formal briefing on this subject; however, [redacted] declined the offer of a briefing until she has had the opportunity to review the briefing material.

[redacted] indicated that she was concerned that, as a result of the Tower controversy, [redacted] would make a major issue of the FBI's conduct of background investigations on Presidential appointees. It is her understanding that [redacted] does not believe the FBI is providing an adequate level of "service" to the Senate. However, [redacted] stated that she has not discussed this issue directly with [redacted] but is reacting to press reports.

The Administrative Services Division requests your assistance in providing Senate Staff with as much information as can be appropriately made available. Criminal Investigative Division personnel have been advised that this request is forthcoming.

[redacted] KTB

[redacted]

March 21, 1989

Mr. Clarke:

RE: JOHN G. TOWER;
INQUIRY FROM STAFF OF SENATOR ROBERT DOLE

On March 17, 1989, I spoke with [redacted]
[redacted] concerning the inquiry we received from
Senator Dole's staff regarding the internal memo concerning the
background investigation of John G. Tower, conducted by the FBI,
for the position of Secretary of Defense that was provided to
Senator Hollings.

I told him Senator Dole's staff's questions were:

- . Was the document part of the file sent to the
White House? Response: No, but the material on which
the memo was based was from the background file.
- . Is this the type of document ordinarily prepared in
SPIN investigations? Response: No.
- . Would this document be covered by the Privacy Act?
Response: Yes, as it applies to third party request.
- . How did this document get to Senator Hollings?
Response: An earlier request had been received by the
FBI from the staff of Senator Hollings for the
mechanics of a background check. The Tower document
was attached to our response to that request.

[redacted] indicated he had received no information that
Senator Dole intended to pursue this matter further, and
indicated he was not troubled by it. He indicated that the Tower
document, in fact, refutes Senator Hollings' earlier statements
that the FBI had recent information concerning Senator Tower's
alleged alcohol abuse, because the FBI document stated "he had
greatly reduced his consumption levels during 1983-1989."

[redacted] stated that the Tower matter is behind us and everyone
is very pleased with the speed in which the FBI handled the
background of [redacted]

1 - Mr. Revell
1 - Mr. Ahlerich
1 - Mr. Clarke

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

KPW:tffi
(7)

Memorandum to The Director from Milt Ahlerich
RE: CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
FRIDAY, MARCH 17, 1989

Prior to the final vote on the Cheney nomination, Minority Leader Dole printed in the Record articles from the Washington Post and the Dallas Morning News entitled "FBI Memo Says Tower Abused Alcohol" and "'Prior Pattern' of Alcohol Abuse by Tower Cited in FBI Document." Senator Dole used both articles as an illustration that some of his "colleagues" are not "content" with the Tower defeat, they are still "out trying to assassinate the character of an honorable man." Senator Dole is concerned over how "this so-called FBI report" fell into "certain hands" and how "it became public information."

Senator William Cohen (Maine) commented on both news articles and he expressed "serious concerns about any member (revealing) an internal memo to the Director of the FBI concerning any individual under investigation." Senator Cohen reviewed various excerpts from both articles and he stated that: "I think that is one of the dangers that has always been inherited with the use of internal memos or references to FBI reports as opposed to files. Great damage has been done to an individual based upon allegations contained in the internal memoranda that are provided for use by various personnel, including the Director of the FBI. I think it is an unfortunate incident. I hope it does not set a precedent for future years."

Remarks by Senator Dole appear on pages S3004-S3005 and Senator Cohen's statement appears on page S3008.

Security of Air Travel

Pages S3023-S3028. Senator Frank Lautenberg (New Jersey) introduced S. Res. 88, a resolution directing the President to appoint a special commission to investigate the events surrounding the destruction of Pan Am 103. Senator Lautenberg remarked that "after all this time, the families and friends of the victims of Pan Am 103 still have not heard one word from the White House--it is almost three months--not a word of condolence, not a word of explanation, not a word of commitment that this administration will do what it can to prevent future tragedies like Pan Am 103...this resolution calls on the President to appoint a commission to investigate the Pan Am 103 bombing. We want to know just what is known, when it was known, and by whom." The impetus for Senator Lautenberg's resolution was a four-hour hearing before the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee on March 14, 1989.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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413, 1989

Director, 7176, #214
Mr. Glover, 7176, #235
Mr. Otto, 7176, #235
Mr. Revell, 7176, #235

Mr. Ahlert, 7222, #245
7222, #245
7222, #245
7222, #245

Office of Congressional and
Public Affairs, 7222, #245
Office of Liaison and Inter-
national Affairs, 7443, #245

6212, #244
6212, #244

DIVISIONS:
Identification, 11255, #341
Training, Quantico, #152
Administrative Services, 6012, #234
Records Management, 5829, #211
Intelligence, 4026, #232
Criminal Investigative, 5012, #233
Laboratory, 3090, #241
Technical Services, 7159, #213
Legal Counsel, 7427, #245
Inspection, 7125, #213

7350, #213
7861, #213
7659, #213
M-956, #154
6236, #244
7278, #245
7150, #245
M-268, #154
M-469, #154

7176, #214.
Telephone Room, 7176, #214

7240, #245
7240, #245

Information Desk, 6437, #244
Mail Room, 1B327, #152
Payroll, 1907, #153
Personnel Records, 6912, #135
Photo Processing Unit, 1B903, #152
Reading Room, 6248, #244
Tour Office, M-956, #154
Voucher Unit, 1262, #153

7240, #245
7240, #245
UCR-GRB, #152
UCR-GRB, #152
UCR-GRB, #152
UCR-GRB, #152

Reading Room, 6248, #244 (Autopen)
Leave Clerk, 6226, #244

UCR-GRB, #152

Per Call
Please See Me
Please Call Me

UCR-GRB, #152
UCR-GRB, #152
UCR-GRB, #152
UCR-GRB, #152

For Appropriate Action
For Your Information
Note and Return

Room _____, TL # _____

PLEASE CALL [REDACTED]
ON 4515 TO WORK [REDACTED]

April 17, 1989

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable William S. Cohen
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Cohen:

Director Sessions asked me to respond to your letter dated March 17, 1989, concerning the FBI background investigation for former Senator John Tower's confirmation as Secretary of Defense as he recused himself from that investigation.

The FBI regrets the release of briefing materials which commented on the Tower background investigation. The Washington Post erroneously described the materials as partial verification of FBI findings in the Tower case. The materials were, however, never approved by the FBI as an official statement by the Bureau of the Tower investigation or for release outside the FBI. As you know, FBI policy prohibits such conclusory statements to avoid unnecessary influence on the confirmation process.

The materials provided to Senator Ernest F. Hollings of concern to you were inadvertently attached to other documents which had been specifically prepared for delivery to Senator Hollings to explain background investigations in general. They were not leaked but were delivered by mistake. The FBI has never tolerated the unauthorized disclosure of any materials to influence political processes. This clearly did not occur in this instance. As such, this isolated incident does not justify punitive action; the responsible official has been admonished. It does, however, reemphasize why the FBI must limit its background investigation reports to statements of fact that are not conclusory and that are delivered in a controlled manner so as to not unduly influence political processes.

Sincerely yours,

Floyd I. Clarke
Executive Assistant Director -
Administration

ENCLOSURE

Exec AD Adm. — 1 — Mr. Glover
Exec AD Inv. — 1 — Mr. Revell
Exec AD LES — 1 — Mr. Clarke
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. — 1 —
Crim. Inv. — 1 —
Ident. — 1 —
Insp. — 1 —
Intell. — 1 —
Lab. — 1 —
Legal Coun. — 1 —
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. — 1 —
Rec. Mgmt. — 1 —
Tech. Servs. — 1 —
Training — 1 —
Telephone Rm. — 1 —
Director's Sec'y — 1 —

MAIL ROOM ☐

1 —
1 — Ms. Pagelsen
1 —
1 —
3 —
1 —

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SSA
ROOM 7240, TL-245

APPROVED:

Director —
Exec. AD-Adm. —
Exec. AD-Inv. —
Exec. AD-LES —

Adm. Servs. —
Crim. Inv. —
Ident. —
Inspection —
Intell. —
Laboratory —
Legal Coun. —

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. —
Off. of Lia. & Int. Affs. —
Rec. Mgmt. —
Tech. Servs. —
Training —

FBI/DOJ

Honorable William S. Cohen

NOTE: The attached incoming letter from Senators DOLE, MC CAIN and COHEN challenge the FBI's release of materials after the defeat of former Senator JOHN TOWER's confirmation as Secretary of Defense. Senators DOLE, MC CAIN and COHEN believed the FBI, or its employees, provided documents to Senator HOLLINGS to vindicate a position taken by Senator HOLLINGS during Senate confirmation debate that Senator TOWER had a drinking problem.

The materials in question were prepared by the Special Inquiry Unit, Criminal Investigative Division and provided to the Budget Section, Administrative Services Division, in response to a request by Senate Appropriations staff for a briefing paper on SPIN investigations. However, additional briefing materials prepared for internal use were inadvertently attached to paper for the Senate staff and were accidentally delivered to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and related agencies, ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman.

Honorable William S. Cohen
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Cohen:

In response to your letter dated March 17, 1989, concerning the FBI background investigation for former Senator John Tower's confirmation as Secretary of Defense, the FBI regrets the release of briefing materials which commented on the Tower background investigation. The Washington Post erroneously described the materials as partial verification of FBI findings in the Tower case. The materials were, however, never approved by the FBI as an official statement by the Bureau of the Tower investigation or for release outside the FBI. As you know, FBI policy prohibits such conclusory statements to avoid unnecessary influence on the confirmation process.

The materials provided to Senator Ernest F. Hollings of concern to you were inadvertently attached to other documents which had been specifically prepared for delivery to Senator Hollings to explain background investigations in general. They were not leaked but were delivered by mistake. The FBI has never tolerated the unauthorized disclosure of any materials to influence political processes. This clearly did not occur in this instance. As such, this isolated incident does not justify punitive action; the responsible official has been admonished. It does, however, reemphasize why the FBI must limit its background investigation reports to statements of fact that are not conclusory and that are delivered in a controlled manner so as to not unduly influence political processes.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Sessions
Director

1 - Mr. Glover
1 - Mr. Revell
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April 17, 1989

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Dole:

Director Sessions asked me to respond to your letter dated March 17, 1989, concerning the FBI background investigation for former Senator John Tower's confirmation as Secretary of Defense as he recused himself from that investigation.

The FBI regrets the release of briefing materials which commented on the Tower background investigation. The Washington Post erroneously described the materials as partial verification of FBI findings in the Tower case. The materials were, however, never approved by the FBI as an official statement by the Bureau of the Tower investigation or for release outside the FBI. As you know, FBI policy prohibits such conclusory statements to avoid unnecessary influence on the confirmation process.

The materials provided to Senator Ernest F. Hollings of concern to you were inadvertently attached to other documents which had been specifically prepared for delivery to Senator Hollings to explain background investigations in general. They were not leaked but were delivered by mistake. The FBI has never tolerated the unauthorized disclosure of any materials to influence political processes. This clearly did not occur in this instance. As such, this isolated incident does not justify punitive action; the responsible official has been admonished. It does, however, reemphasize why the FBI must limit its background investigation reports to statements of fact that are not conclusory and that are delivered in a controlled manner so as to not unduly influence political processes.

Sincerely yours,

Floyd I. Clarke
Executive Assistant Director -
Administration

ENCLOSURE

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FBI/DOJ

Honorable Robert Dole

NOTE: The attached incoming letter from Senators DOLE, MC CAIN and COHEN challenge the FBI's release of materials after the defeat of former Senator JOHN TOWER's confirmation as Secretary of Defense. Senators DOLE, MC CAIN and COHEN believed the FBI, or its employees, provided documents to Senator HOLLINGS to vindicate a position taken by Senator HOLLINGS during Senate confirmation debate that Senator TOWER had a drinking problem.

The materials in question were prepared by the Special Inquiry Unit, Criminal Investigative Division and provided to the Budget Section, Administrative Services Division, in response to a request by Senate Appropriations staff for a briefing paper on SPIN investigations. However, additional briefing materials prepared for internal use were inadvertently attached to paper for the Senate staff and were accidentally delivered to the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and related agencies, ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman.

Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

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Sincerely yours,

William S. Sessions
Director

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MAIL ROOM ☐

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT April 17, 1989

Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator McCain:

Director Sessions asked me to respond to your letter dated March 17, 1989, concerning the FBI background investigation for former Senator John Tower's confirmation as Secretary of Defense as he recused himself from that investigation.

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Sincerely yours,

Floyd I. Clarke
Executive Assistant Director -
Administration

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Honorable John McCain

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United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

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Sincerely yours,

William S. Sessions
Director

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Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

April 17, 1989

Director, FBI

RESPONSE TO A LETTER FROM SENATORS ROBERT J. DOLE,
WILLIAM S. COHEN, AND JOHN MC CAIN CONCERNING THE FBI
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION FOR FORMER SENATOR JOHN
TOWER'S CONFIRMATION AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

Attached are responses to Senators Dole, Cohen, and McCain concerning their inquiry regarding the FBI background investigation of John Tower. Please review the attached and forward the originals to the recipients.

Copies for your records are attached.

Enclosures (6)

3-ENCLOSURE

APPROVED: *[Signature]*
Director *[Signature]*
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Exec. AD-Inv. *[Signature]*
Exec. AD-LES *[Signature]*

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Director's Sec'y *[Signature]*

MAIL ROOM ☐

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

May 1, 1989

The Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Bill:

I appreciate your having Mr. Floyd I. Clarke respond to my letter to you of March 17, 1989, and realize that you had recused yourself from the FBI's background investigation of Senator John Tower for his nomination to be Secretary of Defense.

Unfortunately, first, concerns raised in my letter pertain to the FBI's background investigation process in general -- only as delineated by problems with the Tower investigation; second, the response to my letter fails to address my concern.

While I have utmost confidence in the decision that the official responsible for delivering, by mistake, certain documents to Senator Hollings should not be subjected to punitive action, I am concerned the focus is being placed on the wrong individual.

In particular, Mr. Clarke's letter states that "...FBI policy prohibits such conclusary statements..." and that "...the FBI must limit its background investigation reports to statements of fact that are not conclusary..."

Setting aside that certain items contained in the background investigation file were not "statements of fact," I remain concerned and inquisitive as to why the document released by Senator Hollings was ever prepared, since it seems to be against the policy of the Bureau with regard to "conclusary" information.

I do not wish to belabor this point, as the Bureau has sufficient other responsibilities to perform with limited resources. I do, however, want to bring integrity and trust back to the background investigation process.

Sincerely,


BOB DOLE
United States Senator

AUG 29 1989

3 ENCLOSURE

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Bob Dole
U.S.S.

The Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535



Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

April 17, 1989

Director, FBI

RESPONSE TO A LETTER FROM SENATORS ROBERT J. DOLE,
WILLIAM S. COHEN, AND JOHN MC CAIN CONCERNING THE FBI
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION FOR FORMER SENATOR JOHN
TOWER'S CONFIRMATION AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

Attached are responses to Senators Dole, Cohen, and
McCain concerning their inquiry regarding the FBI background
investigation of John Tower. Please review the attached and
forward the originals to the recipients.

Copies for your records are attached.

Enclosures (6)


1 - Mr. Revell
1 - Mr. Clarke

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1 - Ms. Pagelsen

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ENCLOSURE

161-20403-526

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 17, 1989

Mr. William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Bill:

Enclosed is an article from today's Washington Post which, once again, attacks the reputation of John Tower.

What is particularly disturbing about this story is that it is based on: "an internal Federal Bureau of Investigation document made public by Senator Ernest F. Hollings. The document, which a bureau official said was prepared for use by FBI director William Sessions, provides the first official although partial, verification of what the FBI discovered in its background investigation of Tower."

We are outraged to see Senator Tower once again dragged through the mud after the confirmation vote. But we are even more upset that it was apparently based on an unauthorized disclosure of official documents by an FBI employee.

We'd like to know:

- 1) What is FBI policy against turning over such documents to Senators, and what is the penalty for violating the policy?
- 2) Are you investigating who is responsible for this leak, and what is the status of your investigation?
- 3) What actions will you take against the perpetrators of this leak? Will you do everything you can to determine who is responsible?
- 4) Will you inform all FBI employees that you will not tolerate any more such leaks?

Sincerely,

Don Dale

John McCain

161-20403-5

ENCLOSURE

Issue: The Background Investigation of John Goodwin Tower

Background: On 12/2/88, the Office of the President-Elect (OPE) requested that the FBI conduct an expedite full field investigation on former Senator John Goodwin Tower, who had been nominated as Secretary of Defense. Contained within the initial request was a White House request to resolve a rumor of Tower's alleged involvement with a female foreign national during his assignment to the Geneva Strategic Arms Reduction Talks during 1985-86.

Almost immediately upon initiation, the FBI began to receive allegations concerning (1) alcohol abuse (2) sexual misconduct (3) conflict of interest with defense contractors (4) improper campaign funding activities and (5) Tower's involvement in the "Ill Wind" investigation. Tower's nomination became a front page media event resulting in numerous allegations being received by both the FBI and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on almost a daily basis.

Summary memoranda containing the results of the FBI's current investigative status were furnished to the OPE on December 13 and 23, 1988, on January 6, 13, and 25, 1989 and on February 8, 20, 27 and 28, 1989. + 3/1/89

Key events and Talking Points

* During the period of February 1-2, 1989, a rift developed between [redacted] SASC, and the Office of Counsel to the President (OCP) over the OCP's handling of the Tower confirmation process.

* Pursuant to a letter dated 2/2/89 to Director Sessions from Senators Nunn and Warner of the SASC, and with the approval of the White House, additional investigation was requested into SASC concerns of Senator Tower's continued abuse of alcohol and womanizing, focusing on the period since Tower left the Senate (1983 - 1989).

* On 2/7/89, new developments involving plea agreements in "Ill Wind" necessitated the FBI having to ask for additional time to resolve alleged illegal campaign contributions to Senator Tower by "Ill Wind" principals. The Attorney General and the White House concurred with the need to resolve this issue.

* Immediately upon the return of the Senate from an eight day adjournment, on 2/20/89, a 140 page summary memorandum summarizing and resolving most of the various issues and sub-issues was submitted to the White House. The FBI investigation did not disclose any illegal activity on the part of Senator Tower. However, the investigation did confirm a prior pattern of alcohol abuse as well as the Senator's continuing sporadic use of alcohol, with indications that he had greatly reduced his consumption levels during 1983 - 1989.

* To date the FBI has submitted nine summary memoranda totaling 371 pages, with enclosures totaling another 137 pages. The FBI has interviewed approximately 500 individuals and has re-interviewed 20 of these individuals.

* Investigation involving review of office indices has been conducted in all 58 field offices and active investigation has been conducted in a total of 38 field offices, the principal of which include WMFO, Dallas and Houston. In addition, investigation was conducted in seven foreign countries by both the FBI and the State Department at FBI request.

* The FBI's summary memoranda addressed 21 separate issues with sub-issues which required the FBI to investigate and resolve 69 separate allegations against Senator Tower.

* The summary memoranda were organized by alphabetical designation by issue and source. Each sub-issue was then outlined by numerical designation. The reader was cross-referenced by page number and issue title to the prior summary when an issue was continued from one summary to the next.

* Each issue was fully addressed beginning with the original allegation and all pertinent FD-302's in their entirety were incorporated behind each discussion.

* The scope of the entire Tower investigation was solely left to the discretion of the SPIN Unit of the FBI. The White House did not attempt to limit or curtail in any way the FBI's investigative efforts or limit the timespan of the investigation.

* Our summaries were provided to the White House which then departed from its recent practice of allowing a personal review of the summaries by only the committee chairman and ranking minority members. In this instance, the White House furnished copies of the summaries to Senators Nunn, Warner, and Dole and allowed the senior Senate SASC staffers to have custody of the summaries to assist in their analysis of the investigation for their respective Senators.

* In addition, the White House made SPIN Unit supervisory personnel available on three occasions for SASC interview at their request to provide detailed explanation of the FBI summary memoranda:

Issue: FBI Special Inquiry (SPIN) Investigations

Scope and Nature of SPIN Investigations

Special Inquiry (SPIN) is a term used by the FBI to characterize background investigations conducted by the FBI for the White House, the National Security Council and several select Congressional committees.

Purpose of SPIN Investigations

The goal of SPIN investigations conducted for the White House is to provide White House officials with accurate and complete information concerning the character, loyalty, reputation and associates of a potential appointee, a White House staff member, or other individuals requiring frequent access to the White House. The scope of the SPIN process and the manner in which it is reported are intended to meet the needs of the President and his staff in nomination, employment and access decisions, as well as to assist in security clearance determinations.

SPIN investigations do not, with the exception of some cases involving the judiciary, focus upon an individual's substantive ability in the area of the prospective appointment. While the FBI does check credit records to ascertain an appointee's financial responsibility, the FBI has not been tasked with conducting inquiries into financial matters (e.g., a nominee's investments or other sources of income, or sources of loans). The FBI merely asks knowledgeable persons whether an appointee lives beyond his/her financial means.

Financial statements of appointees are reviewed by White House personnel and are not provided to the FBI. In addition, IRS records are provided directly to the White House and are not furnished to the FBI. If allegations of improprieties relating to financial matters are developed through other inquiries conducted during the SPIN process, or are brought to the FBI's attention by the White House, the FBI undertakes the investigation necessary to resolve them.

It is important to note that the FBI's investigation is not the only basis upon which the White House makes decisions regarding nominations or filling staff vacancies. Other information is used by the White House in making these decisions including personal interviews, questionnaires concerning personal and financial data, Internal Revenue Service record checks, and name checks.

Investigative Process

Requests for SPIN investigations are handcarried from the White House to the FBI, along with Standard Form 86, Questionnaire for Sensitive Position, a supplementary list of 10 "issue" type questions, the individuals fingerprints and the release necessary for access to educational, occupational, credit and other records. This data is carefully reviewed in the SPIN Unit of the Special Inquiry and Civil Rights Section in the Criminal Investigative Division. The SPIN Unit is responsible for the overall field-wide coordination and administration of these investigations. Checks of FBI records systems, and indices including fingerprint files, at headquarters and in field offices are routinely performed. If no previous background investigation has been conducted concerning the appointee, a full-field investigation is initiated which covers the full extent of the appointee's adult life from high school to the present. Assignments are sent by teletype and facsimile to the FBI field offices covering the appointee's place of birth, places of residence, education and employment, and to offices such as Saint Louis where military personnel records are checked if the appointee served in the military.

Because of their sensitivity, SPIN cases conducted for the White House require the most comprehensive investigation to assure that if derogatory information exists, it is developed fully and resolved whenever possible. This standard of complete thoroughness in SPIN matters is absolutely essential to best serve the President in the nomination process and to assure that the nominee's character is not impugned by spurious information, rumor or innuendo.

As a general rule, a minimum of 35 persons, who can knowledgeably comment on a Presidential appointee's background, are interviewed. About 20 persons are usually interviewed in White House staff cases. These interviews typically include references, associates, colleagues, neighbors, business competitors, and others who can comment on the appointee's loyalty, character and reputation. When allegations or any derogatory information are developed, all logical additional investigation is conducted to resolve the issue and may require locating numerous additional persons who can provide more information regarding the specifics of the particular allegation.

Among the issues explored in SPIN investigations are the following:

- a. personal and business credit issues
- b. civil suits as a plaintiff or defendant, including divorces
- c. any removals/dismissals of employment
- d. any contact with representatives of foreign countries
- e. any details of applicant's personal life that could be used to coerce the applicant

- f. any professional grievances
- g. business/investment circumstances involving a possible conflict of interest
- h. details of any psychological counseling
- i. prescription drug, alcohol abuse, or illegal drug use
- j. membership in organizations whose policies restrict membership on the basis of sex, race, creed, color, religion, or national origin
- k. criminal history
- l. "lifestyle" issues i.e. homosexuality, wife abuse, etc

Results of SPIN investigations are reported to FBIHQ by teletypes and reports which are then summarized in memorandum form in the SPIN Unit. This summary memoranda is provided to the White House. Derogatory information, if developed, is included in the summary and is attributed to the person or persons who provided the information. If these persons request confidentiality, their identities are concealed but the White House is provided information concerning the individual's association with the appointee and the basis of the individual's knowledge of the derogatory information so that the White House can properly assess the significance and pertinence of the information. Complete texts of such interviews, with the identities concealed where appropriate, are also provided to the White House along with the summary or are incorporated into the text of the summary.

Investigative Deadlines vs Timeliness

By mutual agreement between the White House and the FBI, flexible time frames for the completion of the background investigation by the FBI have been established, dependent on the nature and priority of the particular position.

Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation (PAS) or Presidential Appointment	25 calendar days
White House staff or access	35 calendar days
On board staff or access (5 year update)	75 calendar days
Limited inquiry or Expanded Name Check	10 calendar days

These deadlines are flexible, depending on circumstances and can be shortened by White House upon request. For example, full-field investigations on Cabinet-level appointees have been conducted in as short as 5 working days but have averaged approximately 20-22 days, for completion during the Bush Administration to date.

While timeliness is a major concern, it cannot be allowed to foreshadow the primary importance of thoroughness. Failure to conduct a comprehensive investigation can compromise the integrity of the entire appointment process and erode both political and public trust in the FBI and the President.

Short deadlines often have an adverse impact upon the quality of investigations, although the distinctions in quality may be subtle. For example, interviews that are normally conducted in person may be done by telephone under exceptional circumstances. However, a person so interviewed is less likely to be candid. Leads which will probably be unproductive, but may possibly open new avenues of investigation, are less likely to be pursued.

Role of the FBI in the Appointment Process

While there has been some question as to the responsibility of the FBI to the Senate regarding SPIN investigations conducted for the White House, precedent and custom have clearly defined the FBI's role in the appointment process. That role has been to provide the President, through the White House Counsel's Office, with accurate and complete information concerning a nominee's character, loyalty, reputation and associates so that the President can make informed nomination decisions.

It is essential that the FBI's role be preserved as an impartial, nonpartisan investigative agency. This is best accomplished when the FBI provides the results of its SPIN investigations to the White House which would then make appropriate disclosure of this information to the Senate, consistent with the needs to secure the confidentiality of sensitive information, sources and law enforcement methods. The appointment of a nominee requiring Senate confirmation requires the interaction and ultimate agreement between the White House and Senate. The FBI has and should have no stake in the nomination or "advice and consent" process. The FBI should not be drawn into this essentially political dialogue. To place the FBI in any other position could endanger the FBI's objectivity and independence upon which both the White House and the Senate must ultimately rely.

June 6, 1989

Honorable Bob Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

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Dear Senator Dole:

Director Sessions has requested that I respond to your letter dated May 1, 1989, concerning my earlier reply to your inquiry about the FBI's background investigation for former Senator John Tower's confirmation as Secretary of Defense.

Our objective in conducting special inquiry investigations is to adequately investigate a nominee's character, loyalty, reputation, and associates, past and present, and to present the facts in a manner so that employment and access decisions can be made by the White House. In performing this function, the FBI seeks to avoid making recommendations or drawing conclusions because to do so could influence the confirmation process. It is the objectivity of the FBI upon which both the White House and the Senate must rely.

I have attached materials that were prepared to explain the special inquiry process in general and the John Tower inquiry in particular. As referred to in my letter dated April 17, 1989, the four-page attachment regarding the special inquiry process was intended for delivery to Senator Ernest F. Hollings as a general explanation of how the FBI conducts background investigations. The two-page attachment regarding the Tower inquiry was inadvertently attached to the general explanation and delivered to Senator Hollings. This document was prepared as a very brief summary of the voluminous Tower inquiry and was intended to be used only as an internal briefing document. The document was not prepared as part of or in furtherance of the background investigation nor was it intended to be a formal statement or document retrievable from the Tower inquiry file. The document should not have contained conclusions but should have reflected only factual information. It was not disseminated to the White House as part of our normal reporting in these inquiries. While it is unfortunate that the document was given to Senator Hollings and that it reflects conclusions, I am sure you can understand how difficult it is to briefly summarize such a complex and voluminous inquiry.

1 - Mr. Revell
1 - Mr. Clarke

1 - Ms. Pagelsen

NOTE: Attached are relevant background materials including the March 17, 1989, letter of Senator DOLE, MC CAIN and COHEN, the April 17, 1989, response of Executive Assistant Director CLARKE, the May 1, 1989, letter of Senator DOLE, and the briefing materials prepared by the Special Inquiry Unit for the Director's review of the Tower case.

JSF:glh (14)

SSA [redacted]
ROOM 7240, TL-245

ENCLOSURE

16 AUG 29 1989

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
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Public Affs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

FBI/DOJ

Honorable Bob Dole

Again, we regret the release of the attached two-page document. As I noted in my April 17, 1989, letter, that release was inadvertent. We believe our past performance is indicative of integrity and trust and hope you share that view.

Sincerely yours,

Floyd I. Clarke
Executive Assistant Director -
Administration

- 1 - Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
- 1 - Honorable Bill Cohen
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____

Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

SSE
CLASS
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REC

March 27, 1989

Emch
1

Honorable Bob Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Dole:

Please be advised that we have received your letter to Director Sessions dated March 17, 1989, regarding an article from the Washington Post.

A response will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely yours,
131

Milt Ahlerich
Assistant Director
Office of Congressional
and Public Affairs

MAILED 63

MAR 29 1989

- 1 - Mr. Ahlerich - Enclosure
- 1 - Mr. Clarke - Enclosure
- 1 - [redacted] - Enclosure
- 1 - [redacted] - Enclosure
- 1 - [redacted] - Enclosure
- 2 - [redacted] - Enclosure
- 1 - [redacted] - Enclosure

mumc (10)

mmu

detached

161-20403-529

JUN 29 1989

Room 7240, TL-245

1- ENCLOSURE

- Exec AD Adm. _____
- Exec AD Inv. _____
- Exec AD LES _____
- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Servs. _____
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- Legal Coun. _____
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- Training _____
- Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

APPROVED:

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Exec. AD-LES _____	Legal Coun. _____
	Training _____

mp

Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legislative Affairs

April 17, 1989

Director, FBI






RESPONSE TO A LETTER FROM SENATORS ROBERT J. DOLE,
WILLIAM S. COHEN, AND JOHN MC CAIN CONCERNING THE FBI
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION FOR FORMER SENATOR JOHN
TOWER'S CONFIRMATION AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


ACTION MEMORANDUM

Attached are responses to Senators Dole, Cohen, and
McCain concerning their inquiry regarding the FBI background
investigation of John Tower. Please review the attached and
forward the originals to the recipients.

Copies for your records are attached.

Enclosures (6)

1 - Mr. Revell
1 - Mr. Clarke
1 - 
1 - 
1 - Ms. Pagelsen
1 - 
1 - 
3 - 
JSH:glh (14)

SSA 
ROOM 7240, TL-245

MAR 08 1990

b6
b7C

March 8, 1990

JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

Captioned individual, who you advised was born on September 9, 1925, in Houston, Texas, and holds Social Security Number 451-46-9866, was the subject of an expanded name check in 1986 and applicant investigations in 1987 and 1988-1989 conducted by the FBI. The results have been furnished to the Office of Security at the White House.

In early March, 1989, the FBI received allegations of criminal misconduct by Secretary of Defense-designate John Tower. Attached is a summary memorandum dated June 13, 1989, which contains the results of the investigation conducted by the FBI regarding this matter.

No further investigation was conducted by the FBI inasmuch as all leads had been completed and this matter had been presented to the U. S. Attorney, District of Maryland.

206-4088

The central files at FBI Headquarters, the records of the Identification Division and appropriate computer data bases contain no additional pertinent information identifiable with the captioned individual based upon background information furnished in connection with this name check request.

Enclosure

1 - [redacted] Room 4371
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
161-20403

PJL:efk (5)

NOTE: Per request from [redacted]
at the White House (PA).

Exec AD Adm. _____
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Exec AD LES _____
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Public Affs. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. Liaison &
Int. Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐

DELIVERED TO MAISON
DATE 3/8/90

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PLEASE EXPEDITE

February 28, 1990

(Date)

MAR 2 1990

TO: FBI, LIAISON

FROM:

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: FBI Investigations

Subject's Name TOWER, JOHN GOODWIN SSN 451-46-9866
Date of Birth 9/29/25 Place of Birth Houston, TX
Present Address 3525 Turtlecreek Boulevard, #21B, Dallas, TX 75219

We request: Copy of Previous Report

X

Name Check

Expanded Name Check

Full Field Investigation

Limited Update

Other

The person named above is being considered for:

White House Staff Position

X*

Presidential Appointment

*PA - NOT FOR SENATE CONFIRMATION

Attachments:

SF 86

SF 87, Fingerprint Card

SF 86, Supplement

In response to your request
there are attached
reports which may relate
to the subject of your inquiry.

Remarks/Special Instructions:

ENCLOSURE

PA PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
HAD PREVIOUS FFI (WE HAVE COPIES)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records/Operations Sections

FR UTD _____, 19____

- ☐ Name Searching Unit, 4989, TL# 121
☐ Service Unit, 4654, TL# 225
☐ Special File Room, 5991, TL# 122
☒ Forward to File Review, 5447, TL# 143
☐ Attention _____
☒ Return to _____

b6
b7C

Supervisor, Room, TL# , Ext.

Scope of Search: (Check One)

- ☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 20
☐ Automated Data Base - 5 & 30
☒ Unrestricted (ADB & Inactive Index)

MAR 02 1990

Type of Search Requested:

- ☒ All References (Security & Criminal)
☐ Security Search
☐ Criminal Search
☐ Main

References Only

Special Instructions:

- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____

Subject Sowers, John Goodwin
AKA(s) _____

Birthdate & Place _____

SSAN _____

Localities _____

R# 314 Date 3/2 Searcher Initials 433

Prod. _____

UTD - 161-20403-DOC-5/2/89

File Number	Serial	Ident	ADB	Inactive	Date of Ref M/Y
161-20403	I	SI			
206-0-2856P1, 2857P1, 2858P1					
206-4088					Interview
190-63761-1P1					
190-13942-118P1					
162-106998					
162-106998					
47-56732					1976 03 1990
9-58342					
44-0-65004					
62-5-57002 X186					
9-59360					
9-63095					
190-8410					

161-20403

b6
b7c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SSR
CLASS
SEC'D
[Signature]

April 3, 1990

(Date)

TO: FBI, LIAISON

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: FBI Investigations

Subject's Name TOWER, JOHN GOODWIN SSN 451-46-9866

Date of Birth 9/29/25 Place of Birth Houston, TX

Present Address _____

- We request:
- _____ Copy of Previous Report
 - _____ Name Check
 - _____ Expanded Name Check
 - _____ Full Field Investigation
 - _____ Limited Update
 - XX Other -LIMITED INQUIRY*

The person named above is being considered for:

- _____ White House Staff Position
- XX _____ Presidential Appointment -Not for Senate Confirmation
- _____

Attachments:

2-ENCLOSURE

- _____ SF 86
- _____ SF 87, Fingerprint Card
- _____ SF 86, Supplement

161-20403-531

7 JUL 24 1990

Remarks/Special Instructions:

* Inquiry concerning telephone conversation with [Redacted]
[Redacted]

4/pam



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

March 8, 1990

JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

Captioned individual, who you advised was born on September 9, 1925, in Houston, Texas, and holds Social Security Number 451-46-9866, was the subject of an expanded name check in 1986 and applicant investigations in 1987 and 1988-1989 conducted by the FBI. The results have been furnished to the Office of Security at the White House.

In early March, 1989, the FBI received allegations of criminal misconduct by Secretary of Defense-designate John Tower. Attached is a summary memorandum dated June 13, 1989, which contains the results of the investigation conducted by the FBI regarding this matter.

No further investigation was conducted by the FBI inasmuch as all leads had been completed and this matter had been presented to the U. S. Attorney, District of Maryland.

The central files at FBI Headquarters, the records of the Identification Division and appropriate computer data bases contain no additional pertinent information identifiable with the captioned individual based upon background information furnished in connection with this name check request.

Enclosure

101-20403-531
ENCLOSURE



U.S. Department of Justice



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Baltimore, Maryland

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

June 13, 1989

RE: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER;

[redacted]
UTL, Dallas, Texas;
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The case was precipitated by information provided by a
Baltimore confidential source on February 28, 1989 that [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] The source was not able to identify which
contracts were involved, how much money was paid, or the
circumstances surrounding the payoffs. Additionally, source
advised that UTL was caught with classified data outside the
United States and Tower may have been used by UTL to rectify this
problem. [redacted] the Chung-Shan Institute of
Science and Technology, which is the Republic of China's top
research center of high technology and science. The source
believed the classified data, which related to the Army Quick
Look Program and the AWAC Program, was bound for the Chung-Shan
Institute.

Interviews were conducted in Dallas and Washington,
D.C. to ascertain if pay offs were made to Tower for the awarding
of certain contracts. All interviewees were unaware of any
payments being made to Tower on behalf of UTL [redacted] and
[redacted] denied even knowing Tower.

Defense Investigative Service files were reviewed
revealing that [redacted]

[redacted]
States, but there were no indications Tower assisted [redacted] in
[redacted]

On March 8, 1989, the above facts were presented to
United States Attorney Breckinridge L. Willcox, who advised that
he would render no prosecutive opinion on this matter as there is
no venue in the District of Maryland. United States Attorney
Willcox stated that if a criminal act occurred, venue would be
proper in the District of Columbia or in Texas.

161-20403-531
ENCLOSURE

SSP

CLASS
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1 - []

MAY 11 1990
BY COURIER5-14-90
egw[]
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear []

Reference is made to a request from your office dated April 3, 1990, which requested that a limited inquiry be conducted concerning Senator John Goodwin Tower relating to information which was provided to your office in a name check dated March 8, 1990. Transmitted herewith is one copy of a summary memorandum containing the results of this inquiry.

Sincerely yours,

WMB/h
William M. Baker
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

Enclosure

WMB/h
PAM:at (3)

NOTE: Senator Tower is being investigated for a Presidential reappointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In connection with that reappointment, the White House requested a name check on Senator Tower. By memorandum dated March 8, 1990, the Records Management Division reported the results of a Fraud Against the Government-Department of Defense investigation of which Senator Tower was the subject. This allegation was reported to the White House in a summary memorandum dated March 2, 1989; however, when Senator Tower's nomination to be

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Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
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Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☒

See note next page

RETURN TO [] ROOM 4371

JUL 24 1990

WMB/h

[REDACTED]

Secretary of Defense was defeated, the SPIN Unit closed its SPIN investigation and did not further monitor the status of that FAG case. When the White House reviewed the LHM provided by RMD, it was determined that prosecutive opinions had not been secured in the District of Columbia or in Dallas, Texas. The White House requested a limited inquiry to have those opinions obtained and to ensure that no additional investigation remained to be conducted in that case.

This summary memorandum was coordinated with SSA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Governmental Fraud Unit, White Collar Crime Section.
[REDACTED]

MAY 11 1990

~~JOHN GOODWIN~~ TOWER

This summary memorandum contains the results of a limited inquiry concerning Senator Tower and supplements the information previously reported in a summary memorandum dated March 2, 1989, and a name check dated March 8, 1990.

Miscellaneous

As reported in the above referenced documents, the FBI initiated a criminal investigation of Senator Tower in March, 1989, based upon information provided by a confidential source who alleged that Senator Tower had been paid off by the president of a defense contractor for his influence as a Senator in assisting the contractor in its negotiations with the Department of Defense. The United States Attorney for the District of Maryland would not render a prosecutive opinion on this matter as venue would be proper in Texas or the District of Columbia.

On April 12, 1990, the United States Attorney's Office, Dallas, Texas, declined prosecution on this matter due to a lack of substantive evidence.

On May 8, 1990, the United States Attorney's Office, Washington, D.C., declined prosecution on this matter as the allegations received were not substantiated.

The FBI considers this criminal investigation to be closed.

from [signature]
PAM:at

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
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Tech. Servs. _____
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Int. Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

RETURN TO ROOM 4371161-20403-532
ENCLOSUREMAIL ROOM ☐



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

MAY 11 1990

JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

This summary memorandum contains the results of a limited inquiry concerning Senator Tower and supplements the information previously reported in a summary memorandum dated March 2, 1989, and a name check dated March 8, 1990.

Miscellaneous

As reported in the above referenced documents, the FBI initiated a criminal investigation of Senator Tower in March, 1989, based upon information provided by a confidential source who alleged that Senator Tower had been paid off by the president of a defense contractor for his influence as a Senator in assisting the contractor in its negotiations with the Department of Defense. The United States Attorney for the District of Maryland would not render a prosecutive opinion on this matter as venue would be proper in Texas or the District of Columbia.

On April 12, 1990, the United States Attorney's Office, Dallas, Texas, declined prosecution on this matter due to a lack of substantive evidence.

On May 8, 1990, the United States Attorney's Office, Washington, D.C., declined prosecution on this matter as the allegations received were not substantiated.

The FBI considers this criminal investigation to be closed.



SSP Memorandum

CLASS
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SER
REC

To :

Date 4/3/90

THK/DEL
From :

Subject:

JOHN GOODWIN TOWER

Reference is made to a telephone conversation between yourself and SSA [redacted] on April 3, 1990.

Senator Tower is being considered for reappointment to the President's Foreign Intelligence Oversight Board, which will not require Senate confirmation. The White House requested a name check in connection with this reappointment. By response dated March 8, 1990 (a copy of which is attached), the White House received a copy of a letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated June 13, 1989 (a copy of which is also attached). As indicated in that LHM, United States Attorney Breckinridge L. Willcox declined to render a prosecutive opinion in this matter as there was no venue in the District of Maryland. He stated that if a criminal act occurred, venue would be proper in the District of Columbia or in Texas.

A review of the Bureau file (206-HQ-4088) relating to this case, which consists of only three serials, does not reflect whether this matter was presented to the United States Attorney's Offices in those areas. Pursuant to a request from the White House, the SPIN Unit has initiated a limited inquiry to determine additional details regarding this matter. Specifically, the SPIN Unit is attempting to determine 1) the current status (opened or closed) of this case, 2) if any appropriate investigation or interviews still need to be conducted, and 3) if this matter was presented to the United States Attorney's Offices in Washington, D. C., and Dallas, Texas, and, if not, this matter needs to be presented for a prosecutive opinion at this time. The White House has requested that this matter be handled as expeditiously as possible.

1

1

① - 161-20403

PAM:pam (4)

JUL 24 1990

4/pam

AUG 03 '92

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[redacted]
"October Surprise Task Force"
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear [redacted]

This is in response to your July 8th letter concerning the FBI's production of documents to the Task Force and related issues. In a meeting between [redacted]

[redacted] and FBI representatives on July 2nd, these issues were discussed in detail.

For your information, and as [redacted] have been advised, upon receipt of your April 6th letter requesting production of certain FBI documents, we began to search and process our records using an expanded scope, covering the period of January 1, 1979, through the present, in order to avoid the possibility of subsequent, future reviews. As such, any pertinent records falling within your expanded timeframe are currently being processed in accordance with established procedures.

You also requested certain interview reports brought to your attention by the Office of Independent Counsel. I have enclosed a September 6, 1989 interview report of [redacted] along with the other requested reports, which were generated during the FBI's 1988 background investigation of John Tower conducted pursuant to his nomination as Secretary of Defense. Please note that FBI background investigation reports concerning Presidential nominations are considered extremely sensitive materials and are usually made available only to committees of the Congress in connection with pending confirmation proceedings. Release to the Task Force has been authorized by the Department of Justice, and only the sections of these reports which are pertinent to "October Surprise" allegations have been furnished. These reports are further described as follows:

1. [redacted] (sic) (redacted), interviewed 12/14/88;
2. [redacted] (sic), interviewed 12/23/88; and
3. [redacted] interviewed 12/21/88.

① - [redacted] attn: [redacted] 4371
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] - Enclosures
1 - [redacted]
3 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

EG:SR (12)

SSA [redacted]
ROOM 7240

161-20403

[REDACTED]

Unfortunately, the FBI is unable to provide written authorization to the Reagan and Carter Libraries allowing the review of FBI documents in their possession. Like the Tower records, requests for records of this type should be coordinated through the Department of Justice. Also, be advised that your request should be specific in describing those materials which are potentially germane to your investigation.

Regarding the supplemental request for FBI documents at Attachment A of your recent letter, [REDACTED] were advised at the above-referenced meeting that the FBI would accommodate this request on a mutually agreeable schedule to be worked out between your staff and the FBI. Because of the volume of records requested and other ongoing document requests, we are not in a position to comply by the specified date, but we will work closely with your staff to make pertinent records available for your review on a rolling basis.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] of my staff, at [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]
Office of Public and
Congressional Services

Enclosures

LEE H. HAMILTON, INDIANA
CHIEF CLERK

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, NEW YORK
SAM GEJDESON, CONNECTICUT
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, NEW JERSEY
HOWARD L. BERMAN, CALIFORNIA
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, OHIO
TED WEISS, NEW YORK

E. LAWRENCE BARCELLA, JR.
CHIEF COUNSEL

HENRY J. HYDE, ILLINOIS
RANKING MEMBER

JIM LEACH, IOWA
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE
DLUG BEREUT, NEBRASKA
PORTER J. GOSS, FLORIDA

RICHARD J. LEON
CHIEF MINORITY COUNSEL

One Hundred Second Congress
Congress of the United States

TASK FORCE TO INVESTIGATE CERTAIN
ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE HOLDING OF
AMERICAN HOSTAGES BY IRAN IN 1980
("OCTOBER SURPRISE TASK FORCE")

House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

b6
b7C

July 8, 1992

Honorable William S. Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Mr. Sessions:

By letter April 6, 1992, the Task Force requested that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") produce certain records and documents which were created, sent or received during the period January 1, 1979, through December 31, 1985.

The Task Force has subsequently determined that in order to fully complete the investigation, it will be necessary to expand the scope of its April 6, 1992, request for documents to include any documents responsive to Attachment A of that request which were created, sent or received during the time period January 1, 1986 through the present.

The Office of Independent Counsel has informed the Task Force that they have returned to the FBI certain 302 reports of interviews which are relevant to our investigation. The interviews in question are of the following individuals:

- a.
- b.
- c.
- d.



In addition to the request for the reports of interview referred to above, I have annexed to this letter Attachment A which represents a supplementary request for documents and other information to be produced by the FBI. The reports of interview and the items called for in Attachment A are critical to our investigation and given the severe time constraints placed on the Task Force, should be produced no later than July 18, 1992.

Hon. William S. Sessions
Page 2

Finally, the Task Force has made requests of the Reagan and Carter Libraries to provide documents to the Task Force which are relevant to its investigation. The Task Force has been informed by both the Reagan and Carter Libraries that in order to review and documents, it must receive written authorization from the FBI. The Task Force requests that the FBI provide such written authorization no later than July 18, 1992.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please feel free to contact [redacted] at [redacted]

Sir

cc: Hon. Henry J. Hyde
[redacted] Esq.
Supervisory Special Agent
[redacted]

ATTACHMENT A

Produce copies of the following:

A. Any reports, communications, memoranda, summaries, audiotapes, videotapes, notes, photographs, logs, transcripts, or other materials which were created sent or received during the period January 1, 1979, through the date of your response to this request that relate to or concern any of the following individuals or entities:

- | | | | |
|-----|---|-----|---|
| 1. | <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 15px;"></div> | 32. | <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 450px;"></div> |
| 2. | Asco Belgium | 33. | |
| 3. | Asco Singapore | 34. | |
| 4. | Asco Malta | 35. | |
| 5. | <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 300px; height: 400px;"></div> | 36. | |
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| 30. | | 61. | |
| 31. | | | |

1. Because of the anticipate amount of material, we will be prepared to discuss appropriate limitations.

B. Any records, documents or other information relating to
any [redacted] coverage
conducted on [redacted] during the period [redacted]
[redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 4/3/89

1

[redacted]
[redacted] Washington, D.C., 20006, telephone
number [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agents (SA)
[redacted] and [redacted] of the FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (FBI). [redacted] was advised of the official
identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the
interview were upon he provided the following information:

[redacted] stated that he is not familiar with an individual
by the name of [redacted] but is aware of an
allegation regarding the release of the hostages that were held in
Iran during the 1980-1981 time frame. [redacted] was inquisitive
as to the FBI's inquiry into this matter because he is [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] was advised of the particular nature of this
inquiry as it relates to an investigation emanating from the
Denver FBI office and in particular the dates October 18, 19, and
20, 1980. [redacted] produced his appointment calendar for that time
frame and made copies available of the pertinent pages. Those
dates in his calendar indicate that [redacted] was in Washington, D.C.
and in fact [redacted] on
Sunday, October 19, 1980. [redacted] categorically denied ever
attending a meeting with other high-level Government officials in
Paris, France regarding the release of the hostages.



SA [redacted] initialed the appropriate pages of [redacted]
appointment book in the event that they are needed at any court
proceeding. [redacted] retained custody of the original notebook and
should be recontacted if it is needed for court.

Investigation on 9/6/89 at Washington, D.C File # 29A-5955
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
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


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WELCOME BACK TO FREEDOM



The 52 hostages return to the U.S. in January 1981: Did freedom ring?

DEAL OF THE DECADE

The story of the Iranian "hostage crisis" is hardly new. It is, in fact, one of the most documented and analyzed events in recent U.S. history. From Nov. 4, 1979, when Iranian students took 65 Americans captive at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, until Jan. 20, 1981, when the remaining 52 Americans were finally released just minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president, the U.S. public and media were consumed with the hostages' plight. The affair has left an indelible mark on the American consciousness.

But a mounting body of evidence—first reported comprehensively by *In These Times* on June 24, 1981—indicates that there may have been a dark final chapter to the hostage crisis, a shadowy side of the story that was kept from the American public. This evidence suggests that officials from Reagan's 1980 election campaign cut a deal with Iran before the 1980 election—not to get the U.S. hostages back, but to keep them there to ensure President Carter's defeat.

Such an assertion has extremely serious ramifications—and the editors of *In These Times* were, to say the least, skeptical when it was brought to our attention. But we were surprised to learn that most of the facts surrounding the alleged deal came directly from reports in the mainstream media. These reports lacked a big-picture context individually, but taken together they had disturbing and compelling implications. After careful consideration throughout the first half of 1987, we decided *In These Times* readers had a right to at least weigh the following facts for themselves.

Reagan's top pollster predicted a Carter victory if the White House could pull off an "October Surprise" and gain the hostages' release before the election. Journalists Jack Germond and Jules Witcover wrote that the

Reagan campaign anticipated such a surprise with a "trepidation bordering on paranoia."

According to the *New York Times* and a congressional report, the Reagan-Bush campaign established an "October Surprise Group"—an "intelligence operation" headed by Reagan-Bush campaign aide Richard Allen—to monitor the Carter administration's hostage negotiations and formulate countermeasures.

Washington Post and *Miami Herald* reports say Allen attended an extraordinary meeting at a Washington hotel with what the *Herald* described as "a man who said he represented the Iranian government" in "early October" 1980. According to the *Herald*, the man proposed to Reagan-Bush campaign aides Allen, Robert McFarlane and Laurence Silberman that Iran release the hostages to Reagan, not Carter, to "ensure President Carter's defeat in the November election."

According to the *Herald*, all three future Reagan appointees said they turned down the offer. Allen claimed he wrote up minutes of the meeting but later lost them. None of the three could remember the name of the man they had met with.

Carter aides negotiating in October 1980 with the Iranian government noted a shift in the Iranian bargaining position. According to former Carter National Security Council staff member Gary Sick, by October 22 the Iranians had changed their demands from spare parts for military equipment to cash assets frozen in the U.S. Such a shift would make sense if Iran knew it would have access to U.S.-made arms during the next administration.

After the Nov. 4, 1980, election, Carter finalized his hostage agreement. No military goods were shipped, and the U.S. returned \$4 billion of the \$12 billion of frozen Iranian

assets.

The hostages were released moments after Reagan was sworn into office.

In early 1981 Iran began receiving U.S.-made weapons from Israel. According to the *Washington Post*, these shipments violated stated U.S. policy, but had at least the tacit approval of Reagan administration officials.

Admittedly, the above evidence is circumstantial—a procluse no "smoking gun." But it does raise important questions about the Reagan campaign and administration—questions *In These Times* hopes that the mainstream media would investigate more fully.

We were not alone in this hope. Carter, in a letter to writers Abbie Hoffman and Jonathan Silvers, noted, "We have had reports since late summer 1980 about Reagan campaign officials dealing with Iranians concerning delayed release of the American hostages.... [I] have trusted that investigations and historical records would someday let the truth be known." Carter's Iranian counterpart during the hostage crisis, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, told *In These Times* he had also heard of the alleged deal. Even released hostage Col. Charles Jack Scott told *In These Times* that "I've seen compelling circumstantial evidence."

Nonetheless, in the 15 months following the first *In These Times* report, the U.S. media has, for the most part, demonstrated a distinct lack of interest in the story. Hoffman and Silvers provided the notable exception with a detailed report in the October 1983 *Playboy* magazine. The respected West German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* provided another investigation of the 1980 arms-for-hostages allegations in its September issue.

Both stories added important new details about the purported deal. They showed how

CIA and former CIA operations aided the 1980 Reagan campaign in its efforts to keep on top of the hostage situation. More importantly, they brought to light the possibility that representatives of the Reagan campaign and Iran may have held a series of meetings in Paris, following the Washington meeting, to work out terms of the alleged deal.

Now someone who claims to have been at one of those Paris meetings has given us *In These Times* a first-hand account. Clearly, arms trader Richard Brenneke's assertions about the alleged deal are not the final word on this very important subject. Accompanying *In These Times*' main story, in fact, is an examination of Brenneke's credibility as a source. In the shadowy world of international intelligence and arms trading, motivations for public statements are not always clear—as demonstrated by the Iran contra scandal. But as with our story months ago, the editors of *In These Times* believe our readers deserve to know about Brenneke's charges.

By Joel Bleifuss

IT WAS MIDNIGHT WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL election between President Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan was about two weeks away. An all-important final debate between the two candidates loomed little more than a week off. With so much to occupy them in Washington, Paris seemed like the last place on Earth to find top Reagan-Bush campaign aides.

But according to an American arms dealer and a U.S. intelligence source, Paris is exactly where several leading Reagan-Bush campaign representatives gathered on Oct. 19 and 20, 1980. Their alleged mission: to make

...the agency in 1980.
Greer and Casey's role at the meeting, Brenneke said, included "making sure the Iranians didn't state on the wrong things, like buying a space shuttle. There was great concern by the Americans that what was said [to Iran] was appropriate for the occasion."

The Americans also managed the finances. None of the \$10 million the Reagan-Bush campaign provided to the Iranians changed hands during the meeting he attended, he said. "The money was to be dealt with through Mr. Casey," Brenneke asserted that the \$10 million passed through several European banks, including the Bank of London in Geneva.

None of the other arms dealers purportedly at the meeting could be reached for comment. Haddad died under mysterious circumstances in 1984. Reporters' attempts to reach Haddad and Ghannouchi—a key Iranian figure—have been unsuccessful. Haddad has refused to talk to reporters.

Brenneke said he did not travel to Paris with the intention of helping Ronald Reagan get elected. "The reason I, along with Haddad and Haddad, went to Paris was because we were told that the hostages' release was imminent. Kerill [his CIA contact] told me that it was absolutely imperative that someone pay attention to details and be part of the negotiating team. At that time I didn't know who the team was. But I went. After all, people's lives were at stake."

the meeting, Brenneke "compared it to the evil and Bessie. They 'came to a conclusion that a deal had been made, and it involved the release of the 52 hostages in January provided that certain conditions were met, specifically the release of arms."

"A month or so after I talked to some folks in the States at Langley [CIA headquarters in Virginia] and they confirmed my suspicions," he concluded.

Mr. X goes to Washington: The alleged Paris meetings were not without precedent. According to reports in the *Washington Post*, the *Miami Herald*, *Playboy* and *Der Spiegel*, Reagan-Bush campaign representatives and a man who claimed to represent the Iranian government met in Washington, D.C., prior to the alleged Paris meeting.

The reports said Richard Allen, Robert McFarlane and Laurence Silberman met an unknown Iranian representative in the lobby of the L'Enfermiers Hotel in Washington, D.C.

At the time, Allen was the foreign policy adviser to the Reagan-Bush campaign. He later became Reagan's national security adviser. McFarlane also later served as the president's national security adviser. It was McFarlane who, as Reagan's national security adviser, negotiated the 1985-86 arms-for-hostages deal with Iran. Silberman, an aide to Allen during the campaign, was later appointed to the federal judiciary by Reagan.

Allen said in recent press interviews that in September 1980 an "executant" McFarlane approached him with the "ridiculous" idea

of meeting with an Iranian representative. "McFarlane wanted to emphasize and, again, I agreed."

In turn, McFarlane described Allen as a "tool," saying his statement was "completely wrong." He said McFarlane "was an individual willing to be Iranian agent and [he] was referred [by me] to the Reagan campaign staff."

During the meeting at the L'Enfermiers Hotel the Iranian told the three Americans that his country was willing to delay the release of the hostages until after the November 4 presidential election, according to the *Miami Herald*. All three men insisted that they disavowed the deal. And yet none could remember the name of the Iranian representative with whom they met. Allen said he lost his minutes of the meeting.



Arms business as usual: guns to Iran since 1980

By Jonathan Silvers

RESPONSIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL activity—a hallmark of both the 1980 presidential campaign and his subsequent administration—could not have reached the proportions it did without the assistance of the international defense and intelligence communities. It appears that the most obliging of these accomplices was the Israeli government. According to Israeli intelligence sources, the Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, has for the past eight years been the White House's favorite vehicle for distributing American aid to causes that are unpopular with the U.S. Congress.

In the circles where such matters are discussed, Israel is known as an aggressive marketer of sophisticated weapons systems. Armed with little more than catalogues and invoices, merchants are routinely dispatched to the world's hot spots, where they peddle everything from Uris to TOW missiles. Prospective buyers sample wares at Israeli arms franchises around the globe. Israel is an "equal opportunity" trader; it rarely discriminates among nations, even when a transaction may conflict with diplomatic objectives.

When pressed, the Mossad has conceded it has exported arms to Iraq, Jordan and Syria—all sworn enemies of the Jewish state. Experts have placed Israel's annual revenue from these sales in the tens of billions of dollars.

That Israel has managed to conceal such commerce is a tribute to its agents' ingenuity. "The Israelis are understandably reluctant to have their arms trade scrutinized, and the U.S. has generally honored their privacy," said Gary Sick, former National Security Council (NSC) staff member in the Carter administration.

Even when caught red-handed selling U.S. weapons to the Iranians in 1985, Israel managed to avoid international censure. Preoccupied with the notion of criminality in the White House, the congressional Iran-contra investigations diminished or neglected to explore Israel's participation in the arms-for-hostages initiative.

"Our mandate forced us to focus on arms deals in 1985 and 1986," said Arthur Liman, counsel for the Senate Select Committee. "There was evidence of Israeli involvement in other years, but we didn't have the time to pursue it, or the ability to expand the mandate."

So while it was generally accepted that Israel had been Reagan's most serviceable ally, the enormity of its arms trade has yet to be recognized by the U.S. Congress. Breaking the embargo: Israeli arms merchants were among the first beneficiaries of the Islamic revolution. Shortly after the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was attacked and 65 Americans were taken hostage in November 1979, then-President Jimmy Carter declared a formal embargo against Iran. All shipments were halted and all Iranian assets under American management

were frozen. American allies were asked to suspend trade and exert economic pressure of their own against Iran.

Iran's impoverished civilians were able to endure the privation. But without a steady flow of American-made military supplies, the Ayatollah's army—which under the shah had been trained and supplied exclusively by the U.S.—was rapidly approaching paralysis. In desperation, Khomeini's lieutenants contacted Israel in spring 1980 and offered to purchase at inflated prices—American-made ammunition and spare parts. The Israelis accepted the offer, and secretly arranged to deliver 20 tons of non-lethal material (armor tires, brake assemblies, buses, etc.) to Tehran.

Carter first learned of these negotiations in late June 1980, when he received an urgent communique from then-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Begin informed Carter that Israel had delivered one plane load of promised parts to Iran. Unless Carter objected, Begin wanted to continue trading; the relationship was immensely profitable.

"Carter was astonished," recalled Sick. "The Israelis were pulling at risk their whole military supply relationship with the U.S. We sent a strong message back to Begin that any sales to Iran would be dangerously counterproductive to U.S. interests." Business is business: Chastised, the Is-

raelis promised to honor the U.S. embargo. Three months later, however, they quietly resumed arms sales after the start of the Iran-Iraq war. "On September 24 (1980), 14 days after the Iraq invasion, Israel can knocking on my door," said Abolmhasan Bani Sadr, former president of Iran. "We accept their conditions; we had no choice."

Arms dealer Houshang Lavi also witnessed the Israeli hard-sell. "On two occasions, the minute the shah was overthrown and the minute the Iraq war began—Israel was ferrying supplies to Tehran," he said. "The agents had many channels, sometimes mailing deliveries via Portugal, Italy, China. Always the Israelis were involved."

According to Efraim Poran, former military adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shami, Israel rationalized its covert efforts as means of self-preservation. "Because of the Israeli war, we will find the Soviets on the border with Iran." By strengthening the Iranian military, Israel could repel Iraq—a long-standing adversary—without sacrificing its own troops.

As the Iran-Iraq war intensified in 1986, Iran expanded upon Israel and its black market to supplement its dwindling military treasury. The Israelis, meanwhile, were becoming increasingly hesitant about the U.S. embargo. Israel later

...the... Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament who would later negotiate the 1980-88 arms-for-hostages deal with McFarlane.

Hani-Sadr said that Rafsanjani sent the envoy to prepare a deal that was better for Iran than the one being offered by the Carter administration. Hani-Sadr added that he believed Reagan-Bush campaign officials embraced the envoy's proposal. Before returning to Iran, the envoy met with senior campaign advisers, according to Hani-Sadr.

The former Iranian leader said he received reports that one of these subsequent meetings was held in Paris in the two weeks before the election—a claim that supports Hani-Sadr's allegations.

More circumstantial evidence giving credence to allegations of the Paris meetings comes from *All In Them* by Gary Sick, Carter's NSC expert on Iran. In the book, Sick claimed that on Oct. 22, 1980—two days after the last of the purported Paris meetings—Iran changed its negotiating position and Carter officials. Sick maintained that earlier in October the Iranians had demanded American weapons and spare parts, but the October 22 Iran specifically limited its demand to cash assets. "This occurred because Iran had been guaranteed another source of U.S. arms," an Iranian journalist told *Playboy*.

Allen, who had previously vehemently de-

recently... Allen... "Broken laws? Whether it involved 'sell-starters' or top campaign officials, any 1980 deal between Reagan and representatives

violations of U.S. law. "Clearly, the Logan Act is applicable in this situation," said Richard... in international law at Princeton University. The act forbids private citizens from engaging in diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments. Other legal experts supported Falk's opinion.

Falk also said that an arrangement to ke-

of legal accountability. "One could make the case that if a delay in the release of the hostages did take place, the persons arranging the delay would have been accomplices to the crime," he said.

But there are questions beyond whether the law was broken. A deal between a US political campaign and a foreign government aimed at changing the course of a presidential election would undermine the democratic system.

Ronald Reagan presided that system during his inaugural address on Jan. 20, 1981. Referring to the "orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution," the new president noted that "in the eyes of many in the world, this every-four-year ceremony was as much a miracle as nothing more than a miracle."

Even for Americans, the transfer of power in 1981 had a miraculous feel. Moments after Reagan took the oath of office, 52 American hostages were suddenly on their way home from Iran after 444 days in captivity.

But in the cynical and calculated world of international diplomacy, real miracles are rare. As a grimacing study of evidence suggests, Reagan's eventual inauguration day—and the circumstances leading to it—had little to do with Providence.

Kevin Sanders, a former Cable Network News reporter, served as a special investigator for *These Times* on this report. Miles Harvey, Joe Neureuther, James Peniston and Jonathan Silver also contributed to the story.



(Left) Reaching out, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin... (Right) Touching someone: The Ayatollah Khomeini... buying arms through Israel.

versed its policy. "We eventually decided to sell any American things to Iran," said Huran.

But Israel was not about to abandon its best customer entirely. The decision to stop exporting American arms did not preclude the covert sale of Israeli-made supplies, the majority of which are indistinguishable from—and interchangeable with—their patented American counterparts. Or, as arms dealer Lavi put it, "A radar tracking device is a radar tracking device, no matter who makes it."

Like any nation involved in clandestine operations, Israel values its deniability, and goes to great lengths to protect it. "Israel has a rather ingenious setup as far as arms sales are concerned," said Sick. "When its salesmen do something that furthers ideological or political objectives, they are officially certified Israeli agents—government emissaries. And when Israel wants to dissociate itself from them, these same dealers are suddenly independents, all official ties severed. The fact is, they all work for Israel."

From May 1980 until Reagan's inauguration in 1981, Israeli arms dealers, official or otherwise, delivered a large amount of U.S. supplies to Tehran through Portugal, Italy and other accommodating parts without attracting the attention of the Carter administration. Dani Sadr said that by playing fast and loose with export rules, Israel did roughly \$50 million to \$100 million worth of business with Hani-Sadr's administration, which ended in June 1981.

Changing of the guard: The dramatic change in the American political climate following Reagan's inauguration—chiefly a by-product of the hostages' release in Tehran—

emboldened Israel. Within months, then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon formally proposed U.S. arms sales to Iran—via the Israeli conduit—in Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger dismissed the idea, noting that such sales directly opposed stated administration policy.

Apparently undaunted, Sharon offered a similar initiative to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, pitching it as a means of befriending alleged Iranian "moderates."

Sharon evidently found some support within the White House. By July 1981 Reagan's Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) had reevaluated its hard-line position and found it wanting. SIG eventually recommended that the U.S. quietly encourage shipments of military supplies to Iran by willing third parties. "It was an experimental program," said one senior NSC staff member. "We anxiously awaited the result."

According to the *Wall Street Journal*, Haig reluctantly approved Sharon's plan in November 1981 at the urging of then-policy analysts Robert McFarlane and Michael Ledeen. CIA Director William Casey later explained to journalist Bob Woodward, "The initiative seemed credible to us, based on the future, post-Khomeini era."

With the State Department's acquiescence, Israeli dealers began working overtime, placing orders and making deliveries

"No one is certain just how much aid the 'moderates' received, but it has been widely reported that billions of dollars worth of sophisticated American military supplies—artillery, TOWs, Hawk missiles, F-4 and F-5 parts—reached Tehran by the time the Iran-contra scandal broke in November 1986.

Sharon had an ulterior motive in soliciting White House support. If Israel could become the sole conduit for U.S. weapons in the Mideast, diplomatic ties between Arab nations and the U.S. would likely suffer. Israel would effectively assure its primacy as America's only strategic ally in the region.

Throughout its first term, the Reagan administration regularly denied that it had anything to do with the resurrection of Iran's military. But in a May 1982 interview with the *Washington Post*, Sharon said that the White House had been informed in scrupulous detail of Israel's impending sales to Iran and had raised no objections. Israeli Ambassador Moshe Arens confirmed this to the *Boston Globe*, noting that "the sales had been worked out with the U.S. government consent at almost the highest levels."

In fact, Reagan's Senior Interdepartmental Group agreed in July 1981 that the U.S. should subtly encourage third-party arms sales to Iran as a way of advancing American interests in the Persian Gulf. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Bobby Ray Inman has

said that the CIA authorized Israeli arms shipments to Iran in 1981 and 1982 for the National Security Council. And the U.S. Customs Service reportedly looked the other way when restricted supplies were bound for Iran. Out of the loop: *Newsweek*, it was easy for the White House to feign ignorance. Although eager for Iranian business, the Israelis were discreet. Covert arms sales rarely attracted public attention, and when they did, the U.S. and Israel dismissed them as trivial. (In July 20, 1981, a cargo plane returning to Tel Aviv from Tehran via the maritime route strayed into Soviet airspace and was shot down by a squadron of MiG-25s. In the aftermath, it was discovered that the plane had been ferrying \$30 million worth of American-made M-48 tank parts and ammunition to Iran. The Israeli government denied any involvement in the incident, but several Israeli officials quietly conceded that their agents had commissioned similar flights. The U.S. publicly expressed shock, but privately continued to encourage Israeli shipments.)

In 1984, however, Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks led the Reagan administration to reconsider its clandestine Mideast policy. Rather than mollify the Ayatollah, four years of covert arms sales had invigorated his wrath. In a quibbling effort to shut the floodgates between the U.S. and Israel, the White House launched Operation Staunch. Arms dealers who for years had shipped restricted weapons to Iran with impunity were suddenly arrested. Branded traitors, they were charged with conspiring to violate both the embargo against arms sales to Iran and the U.S. national interest.

Which is ironic, because one year later Ronald Reagan would call such activity patriotic.

Jonathan Silver is a political reporter based in New York. He is currently working on an account of the 1982 presidential election entitled *Preserving Disorder*.

final arrangements with representatives of the Ayatollah Khomeini on a deal that would delay the release of the 52 American hostages in Iran until after the U.S. election—thereby ensuring a Reagan victory. For their part, the Iranian representatives would give Iran \$40 million and arrange for the country to immediately purchase badly needed weapons and spare parts, in defiance of a U.S. arms embargo.

"Satisfy everybody involved": Richard Brenneke, an arms dealer with CIA connections, said he was at the final of three meetings among Reagan-Bush officials, Iranian representatives and international arms dealers. The purpose of the meetings was to negotiate, not only for the release of the hostages, but also to discuss how we would go about satisfying everybody involved," Brenneke said last month in a sworn deposition to a federal judge in Denver. At Brenneke's request U.S. District Judge Ben R. Carrigan agreed to take his September 23 deposition at a closed hearing. On October 1 (*Denver's Rocky Mountain News*) obtained a court order to have the hearing's records unsealed.

A similar U.S. intelligence source, who was not at the meetings but claimed access to sensitive files about them, corroborated Brenneke's assertions about the existence and purpose of the three Paris meetings. The source requested anonymity.

Brenneke, in the deposition and in telephone interviews with *In These Times*, contended that the meeting was held to work out a final agreement on the manner in which the \$40 million would be used to furnish Iran with military equipment. The alleged arms transactions apparently violated the arms embargo against the Islamic nation that President Carter had imposed in 1979. That embargo, although officially continued under Reagan, was violated by Reagan's own officials, who approved Israeli arms sales to Iran soon after Reagan took office, in opposition to stated U.S. policy (see accompanying story by Jonathan Silvers).

In his deposition, Brenneke said he attended an Oct. 20, 1980, meeting at the Florida Hotel in Paris at the request of Robert Kerritt, his contact at the CIA. Brenneke claimed to have worked for the CIA on a contract basis from the late '60s until 1983—an assertion the agency denies (see accompanying story on Brenneke's credibility at a source).

Brenneke told *In These Times* that three attending the meeting, which lasted from about 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., discussed "the nitty-gritty of what [the Iranians] were going to get, what they wanted to get, financing needs and payment programs."

The Iranians had a long shopping list. They desperately needed weaponry. Not only had Iran just entered a bloody war with Iraq, but Khomeini's military—largely equipped with, and dependent on, American-made armaments—had been suffering withdrawal symptoms triggered by Carter's 1979 arms embargo.

Brenneke told *In These Times* that his role at the meeting was to arrange weapons sales to Iran. He said, to the best of his recollection, he was involved in transactions involving various types of ammunition, Czech-made AK-47 assault rifles, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles and rocket-propelled grenades, both manufactured in the East bloc, and sophisticated American-made aircraft parts. Brenneke told the judge that he would provide, in confidence, copies of the



Donald Gregg: Was he a free agent on Oct. 20, 1980?

and later reshipment of those weapons. Naming names: The Americans present at the meeting, according to Brenneke, in-

cluded William C. campaign chief Director, and Donald C. who went on to become Vice President George Bush's national security adviser. Also in attendance,

1980 Reagan-Bush later named CIA who went on to become Vice President George Bush's national security adviser. Also in attendance,

Arms dealer Richard Brenneke told *In These Times* that he attended a Paris meeting on Oct. 20, 1980, during which Reagan-Bush campaign representatives "discussed...what [the Iranians] were going to get...financing methods and payment programs."

Brenneke said, were Iranian representatives and international weapons dealers, including Manoucher Ghorbanifar, Cyrus Harthemi, Ahmad Heydari and Robert Bence. Bence had ties to SPECT, France's intelligence agency. Brenneke said that French "foreign ministry types" helped expedite the alleged deal.

The U.S. intelligence source corroborated much of Brenneke's account of who attended the meeting.

At the time of the meeting, Gregg was serving as President Carter's National Security Council (NSC) liaison. But according to Brenneke, Gregg "indicated" to him that the NSC—which advises the president on mat-

ters of national security—was not aware of the Paris negotiations. Brenneke told *In These Times* he suspected that Gregg served in the CIA under Bush in 1976, "loitering around the corner" toward the administration.

"But since on Hart, a campaign aide for the president's office, denied that Gregg was any such meeting. 'Dad has denied to me that he was ever involved in anything of the sort,' he said, 'it is all false and absurd.'"

Casey died in 1987. The only public documents of his 1980 campaign activities—records housed in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University—make no mention of Casey's activities on Oct. 18, 19 and 20, 1980.

Further allegations about Casey's role in the Paris talks come from Michael Scott, a lawyer and airplane pilot who was recently charged with bank fraud. Scott, an attorney for Heinrich Rupp, told *In These Times* the effort flew four passengers, including Casey, to Washington's National Airport. The flight left Paris on Oct. 18, 1980. The private jet, as Scott said, was registered to the firm of bin Abdallah, who is now the king of Arabia.

Rupp was described by the U.S. intelligence source as "William Casey's first pilot." Brenneke, who gave his story about the Paris meeting on behalf of a "close friend" Rupp, said he believes "was arrested" for "doing something" agency (CIA) asked him to do. Brenneke said that the pilot had been employed by the CIA since 1967. He said Rupp flew for Air America, a CIA front, and was

Continued on page 10

Going to the source: the debate over Richard Brenneke's credibility

Last May White House correspondents confronted presidential spokesman Martin Fitzwater about allegations Richard Brenneke had made linking the vice president's office to drug trafficking by the Nicaraguan contras. Fitzwater—like many others in Washington, D.C.—questioned the arms dealer's credibility. "Wasn't he on trial? I challenge you to look up his court case in New York... [His testimony] was considered by the jury, and considered by the courts, and rejected."

But instead of being the victim of disinformation, the White House was the perpetrator. Brenneke was not on trial, in New York or anywhere else. Even Vice President George Bush later conceded that Brenneke was not under indictment.

Brenneke is a controversial man around Washington. Unlike many in the intelligence and arms-trade community, he has cooperated over the past year with reporters in their investigations of such delicate stories as contras and the alleged 1980 deal between the Reagan-Bush campaign and the Iranians (see accompanying story).

The arms dealer's defenders say he is a reliable source—someone with precious first-hand insights into the complex world of covert activity. But his critics, the most vocal of whom can be found in the Reagan administration, charge that he is a self-serving teller of tall tales—someone who should never be used as a news source.

Brenneke's critics in the Reagan administration and the CIA are so unrelenting in their denunciations of him, in fact, that one might wonder whether there is a coordinated effort to discredit Brenneke.

To dismiss Brenneke's sworn deposition about the alleged 1980 deal between the Reagan-Bush campaign and Iranian officials. That's a hoot," said White House spokesman Stephen Hart. "I have dealt with allegations from Mr. Brenneke for the last two years. They have never proven true. He has no credibility."

In These Times asked Hart to provide examples of Brenneke's lies. He came up with what he called "two very powerful examples."

The first: "Brenneke has alleged that he had the vice president's sanction to contact Iranians to discuss arms deals, and that is absolutely false."

But Brenneke told *In These Times* his statements had been misrepresented by Hart. "What I did say was that I had supplied Mr. Bush with information relating to arms sales to Iran in mid-1985 when he was in Portland in January 1986. I never discussed it with Mr. Bush. I never claimed that Mr. Bush authorized me to do anything. I make a very clear distinction between his office and the vice president. I did deal with his office—Don Gregg and Douglas Menarchuk." Donald Gregg is the vice president's national security adviser and Lt. Col. E. Douglas Menarchuk is one of Gregg's deputies.

The second: "Brenneke has suggested that he had worked for the CIA. And earlier this year the CIA took the extraordinary step of commenting [on his claim]," said Hart. In most instances the CIA neither confirms nor denies the identity of its employees, but "in this case [it] denied that he had ever had anything to do with the

Yet Richard Ryan—an investigator for the International Center for Development Policy, a public-policy organization with Brenneke is also employed—called the CIA's denial "ridiculous." Ryan explains that the CIA claimed in a public statement that a letter Brenneke had presented Congress as evidence of his CIA employment was, in fact, a forgery.

"There is a problem with the CIA claim," said Ryan. "One needs to question whether the CIA got the letter of recommendation. He claimed that the only member of the media who ever had access to the jet was a New York Times reporter."

Explained Ryan, "The CIA claimed to have received the letter from the Pankis Organization. But the Organization has stated that they never received a copy of the letter of recommendation and therefore can never have supplied it to the CIA. The logical conclusion that one can draw from this 'forgery' was drawn from the CIA's own files, which makes it legitimate. The only thing the CIA's denial proves is that they were willing to be about whose Ego [the letter] from."

Peter Dale Scott, co-author of the book *The Iran Contra Connection* and a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, interviewed Brenneke at length about the Iran-contras affair. He believes the arms deal is credible.

"Brenneke certainly had something to do with the movement of arms to Iran," Scott told *In These Times*. "It's not the ground. If there was such a [October] meeting, he would have been the guy who'd be the logical person to handle it."

CLAIBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN
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MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY
HANK BROWN, COLORADO
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, VERMONT

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

GARYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES W. NANCE, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 30, 1992

The Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

As you know, the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is investigating the so-called "October Surprise" allegations that private United States citizens and Government officials acted to delay or manipulate the release of American hostages held in Iran in relation to the 1980 presidential election.

We would like to review the FBI's background investigation of John Tower prepared in connection with his confirmation hearings to become Secretary of Defense in 1988. It is our understanding that the FBI report may have dealt with former Senator Tower's knowledge or involvement in alleged 1980 meetings between Republican campaign officials and an unidentified Iranian emissary seeking to propose an arms-for-hostages exchange.

In order for the subcommittee to complete its investigation as expeditiously as possible, we would appreciate your involvement in ensuring that our access to the report is unimpeded and immediate. Please have your staff contact [redacted]

[redacted] or [redacted] conducting the investigation, at [redacted] We thank you in advance for your cooperation.

With best wishes always,

Sincerely,

Terry Sanford
Terry Sanford
Chairman
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

James M. Jeffords
James M. Jeffords
Ranking Minority Member

Re Request

see summary memorandum
dated 12/23/88 & 1/6/89 / CCH/WH/1
4/9/92/8

(Rec. 4/8/92)

pls file
IN

161A-HQ-20403

4/8/92

DRAFT

Honorable Terry Sanford
Chairman
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Honorable James M. Jeffords
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman and Senator Jeffords:

This is in response to your March 30, 1992 letter to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, requesting an opportunity to review the background investigation report prepared by the FBI in connection with the nomination of John Tower to be Secretary of Defense.

FBI background investigation reports concerning Presidential nominations are extremely sensitive materials. They are only made available to committees of the Senate in connection with confirmation proceedings that are currently pending before such committees. Moreover, this access is generally provided only on the basis of carefully negotiated arrangements with those committees and only under terms intended to ensure tightly controlled access and limited use. It would be inconsistent with these arrangements to make these reports available to other committees for other purposes.

Although we are therefore not in a position to grant the Subcommittee's request to review the Tower background investigation report, in an effort to accommodate the Subcommittee's interests we are prepared to permit the Subcommittee staff to

review the portions of the report that pertain to the "October Surprise" allegations. Your staff may contact [redacted] of my staff [redacted] to make arrangements for this review.

Sincerely,

W. Lee Rawls
Assistant Attorney General

b6
b7C

☐ Call Me
☐ See Me
☒ Approp. Action
☐ Initial
☐ Per Inquiry

Remarks:

CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICE

Room

7240

12.

Issue

Date _____

4/30/9-
FBI/DOJ

FBI/DOJ

8

b6
b7c

May 4, 1992

RESPONSE TO SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS LETTER DATED
3/30/92 (Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs)

Summaries dated 12/13/88, 12/23/88, 1/6/89, 1/13/89, 1/25/89, 2/8/89, 2/20/89, 2/27/89, 2/28/89, and 3/2/89, were furnished to the White House in connection with the late Senator Tower's background investigation. No reference was made to the issue at hand in summaries dated 12/13/88, 1/13/89, 1/25/89, 2/28/89, or 3/2/89.

	<u>Summary date</u>	<u>Page of summary</u>	<u>Para- graph</u>	<u>Interview of</u>	<u>Date Inter- Conducted</u>
A	12/23/88	3	2	[redacted]	(Refer Tab C)
B	12/23/88	20-23	-	Sen. Tower	12/21/88
C	12/23/88	Enc.	-	[redacted] (pp.1,6-7)	12/14/88
D	1/6/89	6-34	-	[redacted] & Encs. (Summary Fact sheet & 2 news articles)	12/21/88
E	1/6/89	35-36	-	[redacted]	12/23/88
F	1/6/89	37-47	-	[redacted] & Encs. [redacted] letter to <u>Miami Herald</u> & 2 news articles)	12/30/88
G	2/8/89	5	1,5	T-11 (refer to Tab H)	
H	2/8/89	Enc.	-	T-11 (p.1,2)	2/3/89
I	2/20/89	55	1	Hank Grover (p.2)	2/7/89
J	2/27/89	9-10	6	[redacted] letter	-

Deliv. to DOS
5-4-92

John Goodwin Tower

b6
b7c

DELETED

[redacted] further recounted a story which she advised was made public at a news conference (date and place unrecalled), which, if true, she believes reflects adversely on Senator Tower's honesty. She advised that in approximately 1980, Senator Tower was contacted by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and was asked to attempt to secure spare parts for American aircraft which the Iranians were using in their war against Iraq. Allegedly, [redacted] was sent by Senator Tower to the White House to find out if there was any interest on the part of the United States Government in providing these aircraft parts to Khomeini. [redacted] noted that none of this story was made public during the work of the Tower Commission, which was investigating the Iran/Contra matter.

DELETED

John Goodwin Tower

(Deleted)

An individual, who requested confidentiality, advised

(Deleted)

He/she also opined that Senator Tower, as head of the Tower Commission, had "whitewashed" over the Iran/Contra affair in return for the political payoff of becoming Secretary of Defense. He/she provided no information in support of his/her opinions.

○ Keep in file
per Unit Chief
request.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO	OFFICE OF ORIGIN BUREAU	DATE 2/28/89	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 2/3/89 - 2/17/89
TITLE OF CASE JOHN GOODWIN TOWER		REPORT MADE BY SA [REDACTED]	TYPED BY: an
		CHARACTER OF CASE SPECIAL INQUIRY (A)	

REFERENCE: Numerous teletypes, facsimiles and telephone calls between FBI Headquarters [REDACTED] Dallas, Houston, San Francisco and SSAS [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and SSA [REDACTED] San Francisco.

- RUC -

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Where appropriate, Privacy Act (e) (3) data was furnished to persons interviewed. Express promises of confidentiality, both limited and unlimited, have been noted where granted.

APPROVED.	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW			
COPIES MADE:					
2 - Bureau (161-20403)					
2 - San Francisco (161A-4802)					
DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT		Notations			
Agency					
Request Recd.					
Date Fwd.					
How Fwd.					
By					
		SEARCHED _____ SERIALIZED <u>16</u> INDEXED _____ FILED <u>16</u> 161A-4802-36			

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
FEB 13 1989
FBI - SAN FRANCISCO
161A-4802-1A

FD-340 (Rev. 4-2-85)

Field File No. 161A-4802

Serial # of Originating Document _____

OO and File No. _____

Date Received 2-9-89

From _____

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

Mill Valley Ca

(State)

By _____

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☒ No

Title:

Reference: _____

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

161A-4802-1A ①

2-9-89

b6
b7C

Mill Valley

DOB

from Dallas - attended same functions occasionally
w/ Tower - & Mission Bar - one occasion having
dinner - Tower in booth next to him -

[] got phone call at table - Tower leaned over
& made derogatory comments - "who do you think
you are, we went in Beverly Hills" - had been
drinking but not intoxicated -

Seen at Mission drinking but not drunk -
wld be with female companions - never any
scenes - also at church functions

At party recently in Marin with
several Repub. Texans - knew Tower -
upset about his nomination - general conversation
about his suitability

No names -

Field File No. 161A-4802

Serial # of Originating Document _____

OO and File No. _____

Date Received 2/11/89From _____
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)_____
(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)By SA _____
(CITY AND STATE)To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ NoGrand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to
Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
☐ Yes ☒ NoTitle: John G. TowerReference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of
SF T-1

161A-4802-1A2

2/11/89

JF T-1/

✓ said he

He said that he still is sure that it was Toner who was on the same flight to Europe.

✓ He said

some flight.

✓ He still could not remember the name of the

only that she was

at least

✓ He remembers the seat # because there are only (2) rows of smoking seats & Toner was a smoker.

He

was in Dallas at time.

San Antonio 78250.

in San Antonio might have been told

about Toner after the flight.

said he would not remember the story

Toner & girl friend shared the vodka & champagne (S. Tolik may) - brand

Had pre deposit champagne refilled 3 times
Toner drank 2/5 each / at least 1/5 + 6 ounce mini bottle

Toner & girl only eat caviar - drank champagne & vodka when they ran out of alcohol - they gave them the mini bottles of alcohol. - Could have had a small breakfast in the flight.

refused to use his name when asking

all alcohol consumed by 4 people (3 hours)

2/1/89


'b6
b7C
b7D

He wants to remain anonymous. He said
he did not trust anyone in TX.

✓ He said [redacted] must match.

✓ He was [redacted] the flight to Chicago.

✓ He believed [redacted] on that flight.

 said that
* If flight a 767 to Paris

Tower from [redacted] + "It was Hell"
[redacted] said that he did not make up this story
+ he would be willing to take a polygraph exam.
We told about Tower after Perin flight
[redacted] live in Dallas

b6
b7C

Dallas Tx. 75225

✓ Check into other months of flying [redacted] could be on another with
Tanner which he does not remember. It was an international flight
(May - Dec) June he was [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

second to last ~~pair~~ ^{pair} B seat on left side } in 1987
 whether a 787 the pair would be 4B }

3

(only (2) flight attendants in first class on 767)

2/11/89

Tower girl final was dyed / sprayed blonde
hair

- Did not know Tower before Paris flight
- Heard of him over the news but did not
- know him personally.

He was sure it was tower after he
became obvious - +

b6
b7C
b7D

+ she took over

study & handled tower

She is the one who told [redacted] who Tower
was.

Tower was well dressed / but looked like
an alcoholic - broken blood vessels in eyes
bulbous nose.

[redacted] called in about Tower after reading Newspaper
article about Tower drinking on a continual basis of wine
& that other people like secretaries were calling in
complaints about Tower. He felt responsible to call.

Field File No. 161A-4802

Serial # of Originating Document: _____

OO and File No. Bureau

Date Received 2-21-89

From _____

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

CITY AND STATE

By

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

☐ Yes ☒ No

Title:

John Tower
S P I N

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description:

☒ Original notes re interview of

161A-4802-1A (2) (3)

2-14-89

b6
b7C

DOB

POB

in back section
during this flight to
Dulles - F.W., air on 9/87

did not wait on
1st class ~~seated~~

another flight after

2nd flight after

mentioned for

tower was boarded

for

since 9/87 has been

on flight 79 12-14


times. only time recall

from time in flight

no comments about

balcony / or problems

in the flight.

 you are / A.A.
an ~~steward~~
flight attendant

does not recall
names of other flight
attendants.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-2-85)

Field File No. 161A-4802

Serial # of Originating Document _____

OO and File No. _____

Date Received 2-15-89

From [Redacted]
(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)
By [Redacted]
(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☐ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☐ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☐ No

Title:

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

[Redacted]

161A-4802-1A (B)(4)

highball
drinking - short glass - scotch or burbon

not wine

unk #

Mansion Bar - occasion - @ 2 1/2 years -

couldn't identify on other occasions

always had drink in hand

- Herb Caen article -

-

Field File No. 161A-4802

OO and File No. _____

Date Received _____

From _____

(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(CITY AND STATE)

By SA

To Be Returned ☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Yes

☐ No

Receipt Given ☐ Yes

☐ No

Grand Jury Material-
Disseminate Only:
Pursuant to Rules
6(e), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure

Description:

*Article re John Tower
written by Kenneth
Adelman*

161A-4802-1A (5)

'85, James A. Baker family threatened Was Jim B. compared, or en- tion Mexican has the Ba- the. Chemical holds as his

Commerce Baker family threatened Was Jim B. compared, or en- tion Mexican has the Ba- the. Chemical holds as his

ked with Jim a venal man; servant, but a great favor- lite. Had this n" and Ed's mical stock, e big bucks ould be tying old oak trees om Danbury. I answering, ity, Mr. Law-

ternation of nald Regan, Carter envoy laig brought on nine U.S. post-Tito re- ar loan. What Department ist regimes, ell, months surfaced as ca Inc., with those little the latest in ology. Yugo i, just as Mr. turn to State cretary.


e aides, Mr. pany was a y of the Yu- which was d currency, bs.)

also a board he U.S. sub- bank, which a Belgrade lering and 1987, LBS, ported pid- 00; in De- s chairman

tional secu- croft, Mr. ayer at Kis- name part- ising David billionaire ork's idiot- orld swamp en now re-

ie problem ther ethics that the Re- away from Eastern Es- er's coup at Palace in ack into re- y no longer

THE LONESOME HAWK



John Tower has been long on courage and short on discretion during his nearly 30 years in public service. Both have embroiled him in controversy and tossed him in a boundless sea of troubles now.

Mr. Tower has displayed courage to champion strong defense through good times and bad, in committee meetings and on the Senate floor, in cooperation or conflict with the White House. Mr. Tower's wrath could set an opponent's teeth on edge; even the Reagan administration experienced it when deciding to deploy the MX missile in fixed silos in the early 1980s.

And, like David, Mr. Tower would take on Goliaths over major issues. He was right more often than not, and always courageous.

This, ironically, proved costly. Most other legislators, accustomed to compromise all day, develop rounded edges. Not Mr. Tower. He kept his sharp edges, which showed in his sharp tongue.

Still, I was mighty impressed by Mr. Tower's performance as strategic arms negotiator in 1985 and 1986. He mastered technical information far better than expected, built a first-rate team, and dealt with the Russians as a true professional.

Yet his lack of discretion proved troublesome then, as before and since. Not that this directly affected his on-the-job performance — it never did — but it did raise questions about his overall judgment and probity.

Private behavior is fair game for judging a public servant. A person is cut from one cloth of character. No one can be saintly by day and devilish by night. And a defense secretary has no private life. In the military chain of command just below the president, he must be of sound and clear mind by day and by night. No defense secretary gets time off. International crises keep no regular hours.

Moreover, public servants should be more than bureaucratic functionaries. They do set a tone and ideally

Ken Adelman, former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and an adviser to President Reagan on the INF negotiations, is a nationally syndicated columnist.

Where has Tower been left?

an example for the rest of us. As Walter Lippmann wrote: "Those in high places are more than the administrators of government bureaus. They are more than the writers of laws. They are the custodians of a nation's ideals, of the beliefs it cherishes, of its permanent hopes, of the faith which makes a nation out of a mere aggregation of individuals ..."

Where does all this leave Mr. Tower? In a stew.

Granted, President Bush doesn't want to cut, and Mr. Tower doesn't want to run. Loyalty flows both ways or it flows neither; the Bush administration feels compelled to stick by its man to avoid being tagged as the cave-in crowd. And Mr. Tower has been blackened so badly already that he must reckon: What's a little more mud?

Yet the stewing must stop. Critical budget decisions affecting the Pentagon for the next four years are being made without a defense secretary. Mr. Bush's designating his first week as "ethics week" went astray. And Mr. Tower's fate, in the near term anyway, stands somewhere between a ruptured duck and a dead duck.

And unfortunately after all this, Mr. Tower no longer has any unique advantage. He's not known as a strategist, a la James Schlesinger; or as a whiz-bang manager, like Robert McNamara; or as a first friend of the president, like Cap Weinberger.

Mr. Tower once offered uniquely collegial dealings with the Congress

in general and the Senate Armed Services Committee, his stomping grounds for 24 years, in particular. No longer.

The Senate vibes, especially from the Armed Services Committee, are increasingly negative. This counts for a lot, since these men know Mr. Tower best and since they hold the power here.

Most of the time most senators feel themselves less powerful than those in the executive branch. But not in the confirmation process. Here the nominee is almost wholly in the committee's, and then the Senate's, hands.

This process constitutes the quintessence of John C. Calhoun's concept of government by concurrent majority, wherein a willful band of senators can halt a critical action, the appointment of a president's person to implement his policies.

While the process does not work flawlessly — Walter Hickel, Theodore Sorenson, Clement Haynsworth, William Clark, and other capable, decent men from sundry administrations were unnecessarily bruised — it does work fairly well.

For senators are, by and large, keen at gaining a sense of the nominee. They arrive near the top of their profession due to their skill at sizing up. As the great House Speaker Sam Rayburn once said, "A man who can't size up another person when he walks in the room had better be in another profession."

If the Senate's collective wisdom continues to be negative, or if Mr. Tower's inferno burns further out of control, Mr. Bush best name a replacement fast.

As a proven manager, experienced hand, broad strategic thinker, and squeaky clean public figure, no one can hold a candle to Donald H. Rumsfeld.

Had Mr. Rumsfeld been selected first, the Bush administration would be in better shape, defense decisions better made, and John Tower's reputation better intact.

The la- cur tax. Unlike cures, this some of Wall out threaten as a whole int Many in Ce concerned about buyouts — nanced by m. a total of \$1 1978-83, LBO. \$160 billion The highly LBO of RJR- an unprece clamor to "d thing — about Congress or whether — craze was su Means Chair ski: "There's Hill to do soni shouldn't hav There are se come out of b He's right. of LBOs that that they inc ness by mak cient. But I still sional debate has created think the cus has created against saving thus encoura debt financin Our tax cod ble tax" on in invested. Ar from investm corporate lev again at the the investor Moreover, inte ible for busin paid out to sto ductible. This doubl investment ha markets away wards, and tov Most of the widely consid work. Cutting est deduction of capital for age takeover who will still interest costs the 1987 Black crash on cor limit the cor tion. Allowing a — even in re tion of inte wouldn't work overall cost o vis-a-vis thei And while pe of dividends of capital, mu

Robert W. K senator from Senate Small

2-17-89
4:45 p.m. Mark Hopkins Hotel 1. Switch board - Vd out [redacted] Line

392-3434

2. Sales Dept. - conferences

↓
- Institute for Contemporary Studies -
981-5353
243 Kearny

3. Security - [redacted]

5:00pm [redacted] called - gone

b6
b7C

5:10 p.m. [redacted] Sales



~~Catering~~

[redacted] - Bellhop

(7:30 p. Peacock Court Rm)

FD-340 (Rev. 4-2-85)

Field File No. _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

OO and File No. SF 161A-4802

Date Received _____

From _____

By _____

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: John Goodwin Tower
SPIN (A)

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of

161A-4802-1A(6)

161 A-4820-
1A(6)

Interview
notes of

①

2/17/89

Jan

b6
b7C
b7D

Sept. 3 "AA" sounds like correct time of flight

- Didn't know him at first

- [redacted]

b7D

- Don't reveal person [redacted] name

① IT WAS definitely an evening flight
Don't serve STOLI & CALIXA on day
flights.

② FM DALLAS TO PARIS or London

Pre-departure - Tower himself had
3 glasses of Champagne at least

- Companion - not sure how much she had.
Tower - OBnoxious, Arrogant, Lack of manners
Treated me as Low Level

③ AFTER Take-off

Drank more Champagne
- Approximately two bottles between
the two - next hours.

Tower/Companion chose not to eat.

- Cabin service / -

b7D

sure they killed
drank entire

- [redacted]

- [redacted] (6) btl's - minis on their
[redacted] so Prob (8) minis. Tray Table

- Necked for awhile, like honey mooners,

(2)

b7D

- Tower went to sleep first
- slept about 4 hrs.

18-9 hrs.)

Drinking w/in 4 hrs.

$$QT. 32 \frac{4}{128} = 2\frac{4}{2502} = (24-25)$$


Pre = 3

Vodka = 14

= 8.16

(20) (5-6 per hr.)

*



dealt w/Tower.

④ saw tower consume vodka

Possible - changed to Volker Rock
AFTER TAKE-OFF

Cham, high may have been
on ground.

Possible AFTER Take off - only under.

FD-340 (Rev. 4-2-85)

Field File No. _____

Serial # of Originating Document _____

OO and File No. SF 161A-4802

Date Received 2/17/89

From _____

(Name of Special Agent)

(Name of Special Agent)

By _____

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: John Goodwin Tower;
Spin (A)

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☐ Original notes re interview of _____

7 - Polygrams

2 - FD 497

1 - FD 498

1 - FD 328

1 - FD 395

161A-4802-1A(7)

Polygraph Examination Worksheet

Date of Report 2/24/89	Date of Examination 2/17/89	Bureau File Number ---	Field File Number SF 161A-4802
Location of Examination SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA		Examiner Name SA [redacted]	14 b6 b7C
Examinee Name (Last, First, Middle) [redacted]		SSN [redacted]	b6 b7C b7D
Date of Birth [redacted]	Age [redacted]	Place of Birth [redacted]	
HT [redacted]	WT [redacted]	Sex [redacted]	
Marital Status [redacted]		Current Address [redacted]	
Previous Polygraph Examination None		Language During Exam English	
Requested By Examinee <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No			

Education (Total Years) 1	[redacted]
Employment History Summary	[redacted]
During High School - [redacted]	
[redacted]	
Health/Medication	[redacted]
[redacted]	

Arrests/Convictions
None admitted.

161A-4802
1A(7)

Check One Only	FBIEMP/APP	Type of Investigation	Total Examiner Time (Include Travel)
Subject	Special Agent	Criminal	8 Hours
Victim	Support	FCI	
Witness <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Translator	Admin. Inquiry	Estimated Property Value
Suspect	Contract	PSPP	
Asset		Applicant	
Informant	Leak Case <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	WITSEC	
Applicant		Other Federal	
FBI Employee			

Date(s)	Time In	Time Out	Type Test	ZOC	MGQT	R/I	POT	STIM	Total
2/27/89			No. Series						b7E
			No. Charts						
			Instrument Serial No.						

Examination Results

DI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	INC		Pretest Admission	Confession	
NDI		NO		Post Test Admission	Confession	

Comments (Name of Witness or Interpreter)

[redacted] stopped test during I-1 to advise he didn't know TOWER's first name during flight.

(Subject didn't furnish complete health information).

SF 161A-4802
RWH/er

Education (continued)

--

Employment (continued)

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Polygraph Examination Worksheet

Date of Report	Date of Examination 2/17/89	Bureau File Number 161-20403	Field File Number SF161A-4802
Location of Examination SAN FRANCISCO, CA		[Redacted] b6 b7C	
Examinee Name (Last First Middle) [Redacted] b6 b7C b7D			
Date of [Redacted]			
[Redacted]			
Previous Polygraph Examination None	Language During Exam Eng 1.34	Requested By Examinee <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	
Educ [Redacted]			
[Redacted]			
Health/Medication [Redacted] b7E			
Arrests/Convictions None Admitted			

Check One Only	FBI EMP/APP	Type of Investigation	Total Examiner Time (Include Travel)
Subject	Special Agent	Criminal	8 Hours
Victim	Support	FCI	
Witness <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Translator	Admin. Inquiry	Estimated Property Value
Suspect	Contract	PSPP	
Asset	Leak Case <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	Applicant	
Informant		WITSEC	
Applicant		Other Federal	
FBI Employee			

Date(s)	Time In	Time Out	Type Test	ZOC	MGQT	R/I	POT	STIM	Total
2/17/89			No. Series						b7E
			No. Charts						
			Instrument Serial No.						

Examination Results

DI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INC		Pretest Admission		Confession	
NDI	<input type="checkbox"/> NO		Post Test Admission		Confession	

Comments (Name of witness or interpreter) **STOPPED TEST DURING I-1 TO ADVISE HE DIDN'T KNOW TOWER'S FIRST NAME** b6 b7C b7D
(Subject didn't furnish complete Health information) During Flight

Education

Employment

FD 497 P. 2 (continued)

Employment (cont)



b7D

POLYGRAPH REPORT

DATE OF REPORT	DATE OF EXAMINATION 2/17/89	BUREAU FILE NUMBER 161-2043	FIELD FILE NUMBER SF 161A-4802
FIELD OFFICE OR AGENCY REQUESTING EXAMINATION FBI, SAN FRANCISCO			
AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL SAC, SAN FRANCISCO			DATE AUTHORIZED 2/16/89
[REDACTED]			b6 b7C b7D

CASE TITLE JOHN Goodwin Tower;
SPIN (A)

REFERENCES

b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

CASE SYNOPSIS/EXAMINER CONCLUSION

[REDACTED]

EXAMINER NAME:

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

CONSENT TO INTERVIEW WITH POLYGRAPH

PLACE: San Francisco, California
 DATE: 2/17/89
 TIME: 9:45 A.M.

Before we begin an examination by means of the polygraph in connection with the truthfulness of subject's statements to the FBI.

you must understand your rights.

YOUR RIGHTS

You have the right to refuse to take the polygraph test.

If you agree to take the polygraph test, you have the right to stop the test at any time.

If you agree to take the polygraph test, you have the right to refuse to answer any individual questions.

WAIVER AND CONSENT

I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I voluntarily agree to be examined by means of the polygraph during this interview. I understand and know what I am doing. No threats or promises have been used against me to obtain my consent to the use of the polygraph. I understand that the examination room (~~DOES~~) (DOES ~~NOT~~) contain an observation device and that the examination (~~WILL~~) (WILL ~~NOT~~) be monitored or recorded.

b6
b7C
b7D

SIGNE

[Redacted Signature Box]

[Redacted Name Box]

S.A. Felt

b6
b7C

WITNESS: _____

INTERROGATION; ADVICE OF RIGHTS

YOUR RIGHTS

Place SAN FRANCISCO,
Date 2/17/89
Time 9:51 A.M.

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.

You have the right to remain silent.

Anything you say can be used against you in court.

You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during questioning.

If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish.

If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Witness

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SA, FBI

Witness: _____

Time: 9:58 A.M.

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C

Field File No. 161A-4802

Serial # of Originating Document _____

OO and File No. _____

Date Received 12/21/88

From _____

(Name of Contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

(City and State)

By _____

(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned ☐ Yes ☒ No Receipt Given ☐ Yes ☒ No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ☐ Yes ☒ No

Title: JOHN GOODWIN TOWER
SPIN(A)

Reference: _____
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: ☒ Original notes re interview of _____

② TAPE CASSETTE OF RECORDING
OF INTERVIEW

161A-4802-1A(8)

302.

12/21/88

b6
b7c

12⁰⁰ PM and

- creds displayed emp: [redacted]
- reason: [redacted] re JT, Presidential assist w/
sen conf in; prev intv of [redacted]
[redacted] name provd.
- confidentiality explained i.e. not requested.
- read 302 ... as to be what happened?
- 12¹³ PM - Tape begins.
- [redacted] on this very
subject. [redacted] is the source of [redacted] info.
- clarified several points in the 302.

connections to 302

in late 9/80 ^{early} 10/80 an emissary of [] cited
(1) JT not [] himself

8/25/88

(2)

(3) the general story of Reagan-Bush ¹⁹⁸⁰ campaign reportedly meeting secretly w/ Reps. of [] in arms for hostages ^{before Nov 1980 election}
deal was first put out by [] However, [] is not the source for this particular aspect of this general story, [] so.

(4)

was formally employed by campaign - Pat's HQ
prior: wkd for [] Transition Team - Top floor
at [] when [] Downtown Wash still wkd w/
[] + White House - West Wing
Came - I was [] I went w/ him to [] moved into Cat [] before he left - []

(5)

Per [] thru my source JT asked [] to set up ^{then}
a mtg between the emissary of the [] and top officials
of the R-B camp, i.e. not w/ the WH, but w/ the camp -

Came back to [] (1)
CA - "family matters" till late 83 of Civil Rts Div.

12:00 PM ~~arrd~~ — ID display of creds

12:09. ☐ began to type
— nature of inquiry

12:50 interview concluded

12:55 departed

(3) Cont.

- provd summary fact sheet

background of general story events will be in book

- pointed out #3.

- she spoke w/ [] in his ofc in WDC. [] told her he had just hung up

phone w/ [] who told him for first time that it was JT who was just ctd by the arm. of

[] [] was cky the story just released by [] at the []
she was intd on camera.MOST
CRITICAL
PIECE OF
INFO→ not
PP

thus
- says the true origin of the arms sales began w/ ^{a series of} ~~secret~~ ^{secret} agreements, ^{which} including [] ^{primary} as the 1st of which is this mtg so desc'd abv. Shared article from front pg. of Wash Post on 11/29/86.

- says all the individuals involved have publicly.

acknowledged the mtg - cites a series of articles written in

8/87-4/88 by reporter

Charly for the Miami Herald as source.

[] to
[] at
the time.

They disagree on

a) who the emissary was - [] ctd then w/
b) exact date. some facts about who
the emissary was.

- says these three are not forthcoming w/ all details of this mtg.

- says [] rep. offer was to provide the hostages to
Reb camp in exch. for F-14 parts. This was the basic offer.
cites the source of info as their intr's by Miami Herald.

(3)

Privacy Act

- wish name withheld from receipt? White House?
- exception to Privacy Act T-Symbol

Entr

name, persons present, time date, agree?

Bkg Inv re Sen J.T.

read 302

author

Ex Order

10

Presidential
Appoint. w/
Sen. J.T.
conf.

- [] told her he had just been on phone w/
[] + [] + that [] told him that
the "Union" had 1st ctd JT & that it was
JT who told [] to put the team together w/
[] then ask [] to come because
[] was an atty.

- ~~But~~ These three men all claim that nothing
came from this mtg, but it is the p^t of my
wk for 2 yrs to demonstrate that everything
came from this mtg + they're not telling the
truth. There were follow-up mtgs in some in
Paris. Where even more top-level mfrs of []
[] met w/ even more top-level mfrs. +
cut an arms for hostages deal. Cites Miami
Herald.

- Thus "JT was at the center. & the reason
he was brought into the Tower Comm- was to cover
up his own culpability. I believe as the center of the
scandal" Until I hear more from [] in two wks,
can't confirm.

- Haven't confd w/ [] yet. Been very busy, wanted to
pull together as much info as psbl, then ctd the 3
principles. Haven't ctd JT himself. want []
negation 1st. Haven't ctd []

- I believe JT was at the center in general because [] was his [] & has been close to him always. JT is an old personal friend of ~~the~~ Pres Bush. He supported B in 1980 against RR. He was close advisor to RB camp. It was after this mtg in L'Enfant Plaza that JT was instrumental. Then 2-3 wks later in Paris that Bush met w/ top officials.

9/5/88 [] wrote a story on this for
Der Sp but he left out all of this
"critical info" It finds this troubling

[] motive to tell []?
[] was reacting to her big press
conf. and thought "this is gonna come unraveled"
Thus. That's why he told the truth.

[] said [] told him that it was
[] who insisted to meet w/ these reps... which
It sees as [] beginning to shift responsibility to
[] for the mty.

[] did not call JT

It thinks this is similar to Watergate
in scandal potential

It says


Sen. Muskie

[]
Tower

on record: says he briefed
[] on what Carter was doing
to get the hostages out during the
election

} former boss of []

12^{SP}



b6
b7C